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SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AS SOUNDBITE: 
THE CASE OF CEO PAY RATIOS 
STEVEN A. BANK* 
GEORGE S. GEORGIEV** 
Abstract: This Article analyzes the history, design, and effectiveness of the 
highly controversial CEO pay ratio disclosure rule, which went into effect in 
2018. Based on a regulatory mandate contained in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
the rule requires public companies to disclose the ratio between CEO pay and 
median worker pay as part of their annual filings with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). The seven-year rulemaking process was politically 
contentious and generated a level of public engagement that was virtually un-
precedented in the long history of the SEC disclosure regime. The SEC sought 
to minimize compliance costs by providing firms with maximum methodologi-
cal flexibility, expressly foregoing any effort to ensure data comparability across 
firms. The sizable pay gaps highlighted by the newly reported pay ratios attract-
ed extensive attention from the media and various non-corporate constituencies, 
fueling public outrage, motivating new proposed legislation, and reinforcing 
concerns over pay inequity and economic inequality. At the same time, the pay 
ratio’s role in investor decisionmaking remains uncertain. We suggest that the 
pay ratio disclosure rule represents a unique approach to disclosure, which we 
term disclosure-as-soundbite. This approach is characterized by (1) high public 
salience—the pay ratio is superficially intuitive and resonates with the public to 
an extent much greater than other disclosure, and (2) low informational integri-
ty—the pay ratio is a relative outlier in terms of certain baseline characteristics 
of disclosure, meaning that the information is lacking in accuracy, difficult to in-
terpret, and incomplete. We find that in its current formulation, the rule is inef-
fectual and potentially counterproductive when viewed as a means of generating 
useful and reliable information for investors, or influencing firm behavior on 
matters of worker and executive compensation. The pay ratio is more successful 
in fomenting or contributing to public discourse on broader societal matters re-
lating to pay inequity and economic inequality, though the quality of the under-
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lying information likely limits the quality of the discourse. Given the low prob-
ability of legislative action in this area in the near term, we propose that the SEC 
should seek to improve the rule’s informational integrity by mandating a narra-
tive disclosure approach that provides information about median worker pay 
and the resulting pay ratio with more context, nuance, and explanation. This 
would be consistent with the format of existing disclosure requirements relating 
to executive compensation, and it would represent a positive move away from 
the disclosure-as-soundbite approach. A related and broader question about the 
need for disclosure of non-executive compensation and human capital manage-
ment practices deserves further academic study. 
INTRODUCTION 
With skillful framing, simple statements about otherwise complex mat-
ters such as compensation arrangements are capable of evoking strong, even 
visceral reactions. For example, a rank-and-file worker may be upset when 
she reads that her company’s CEO makes more in a single day than she does 
over the course of an entire year.1 A senior citizen may be displeased when he 
reads that, after losing 18 percent of its value in a year, a company in his re-
tirement portfolio rewarded its CEO by paying him 522 times more than its 
typical worker.2 A taxpayer may be surprised when she learns that a company 
that receives close to $300 million per year in government subsidies pays its 
CEO 295 times more than its typical worker.3 And a consumer may be taken 
aback when he finds out that the product he is about to buy is made by a 
company where the CEO gets paid 5,000 times more than the typical worker.4 
Each of these examples links the pay of workers to that of the CEO, and 
each is based on the regulatory filings of a real, well-known U.S. company. 
The underlying information became available for the first time in the spring 
of 2018 as a result of the implementation of the controversial pay ratio disclo-
sure mandate adopted by Congress as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”). Pursuant to this mandate, over 3,000 publicly-traded com-
panies in the United States are required to disclose the annual total compensa-
tion paid to the CEO, the annual total compensation paid to the median (i.e., 
typical) employee, and the ratio between the two.5 
The newly-disclosed pay ratio figures have captured public imagination 
in ways that the typically long and technical corporate disclosure documents 
never do. The sizable pay gaps highlighted by the data have generated exten-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra Part I. 
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sive media coverage, fueling public outrage and reinforcing concerns over 
pay inequity and economic inequality.6 Progressive politicians, including 
Senator Elizabeth Warren and Senator Bernie Sanders, have cited the pay ra-
tio data when proposing new business regulation bills. The city of Portland, 
Oregon has imposed a penalty business tax on firms whose pay ratio exceeds 
100:1.7 Similar measures have been proposed in states from California to Illi-
nois to Massachusetts, and at the federal level.8 All the while, corporate 
boards and managers have worked to calculate the data and contain the public 
relations impact, whereas investors have been uncertain on how to incorpo-
rate the data in their decisionmaking.9 In short, the pay ratio disclosures have 
already touched many aspects of public and economic life in the United 
States. This incredible flurry of activity is ripe for academic analysis. 
Our Article presents the first comprehensive study of the pay ratio regu-
latory project—its history, design, and effectiveness. We suggest that the pay 
ratio disclosure rule reflects a unique approach to securities disclosure, which 
we term disclosure-as-soundbite. The uniqueness of this approach is a func-
tion of two key attributes: the pay ratio’s high public salience and its low in-
formational integrity. 
High public salience is a deliberate and ingenious design feature of the 
rule. By linking the earnings of workers to those of corporate executives, the 
pay ratio takes on a personal dimension and resonates with the public to an 
extent that is much greater than information about CEO pay alone. The sin-
gle-number ratio is superficially simple and intuitive, and can appear to carry 
a great deal more information than it actually does.10 This explains its success 
in attracting the attention of a broad set of audiences, including the news me-
dia, national politicians, state and local governments, labor unions, think 
tanks, and firms’ employees and customers (in addition to corporate deci-
sionmakers and advisers). We detail each of these audiences’ uses of pay ratio 
data in Part III. 
The flipside of the pay ratio’s high public salience is its low informa-
tional integrity relative to the rest of the securities disclosure regime. Though 
not perfect, disclosure rules generally share certain baseline characteristics—
accuracy, comprehensibility, and completeness. The pay ratio is an outlier on 
each of these counts. The accuracy of the information is questionable because 
of the broad ways in which the SEC defined the underlying inputs, median 
worker pay and CEO pay, along with the methodological flexibility it granted 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 See infra notes 235–239 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra Part III.D. 
 10 See infra Part V.A. 
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firms in making the relevant calculations. Each firm’s pay ratio also presents 
a challenge of interpretation, and hence comprehensibility, because of the 
absence of objective pay ratio benchmarks and the lack of comparability 
among different firms’ ratios. Finally, the SEC rule requires firms to disclose 
only numbers, without explanation or context, which renders the information 
incomplete in what we believe are important ways.11 
The pay ratio’s low informational integrity is illustrated by the ease with 
which individual firms’ characteristics can skew the reported figures. A firm 
with a founder-CEO who draws a modest annual salary while holding a large 
block of stock would report a low pay ratio, hiding the fact that the founder-
CEO may have profited greatly from the annual appreciation of his stock 
holdings. Firms organized as limited partnerships, a common model in the 
private equity industry, compensate their CEOs primarily through partnership 
distributions. Because those are not included in the calculation of annual total 
compensation, such firms may also report pay ratios that are artificially low. 
Finally, if two firms in the same industry differ only in the way their labor 
force is organized, with one of them outsourcing its low-paid jobs, the firms 
would report widely different pay ratios, which would obscure internal pay 
equity rather than illuminate it.12 
The nature of the pay ratio also makes any aggregate information ex-
tremely malleable. Different news stories during the 2018 corporate reporting 
season contained different aggregate CEO-to-worker pay ratios, ranging from 
361:1 at the high end to 144:1 at the low end, with several other reported rati-
os occupying spaces in between. These differences were due to different 
sample sizes, the timing of aggregation, the aggregation methodology (aver-
age vs. median), and other factors.13 On a superficial level, however, each of 
the ratios purported to reflect the economy-wide CEO-to-worker pay ratio. 
Even when the precise method of aggregation was flagged in the reports, it 
likely did not register with the public. Without context, the various aggregate 
figures function as little more than soundbites that can be deployed in the ser-
vice of various rhetorical points. 
How did this unusual disclosure rule come to be? How did it emerge 
from the SEC rulemaking process? And is there a way to address its problems 
short of scrapping it altogether? The full story of the pay ratio is interesting in 
its own right and has not been told before. The pay ratio disclosure mandate 
was a brief—and last-minute—addition to the 2,300-page Dodd-Frank Act. 
Though not directly related to the financial crisis, the pay ratio rule generated 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 See infra Part II.C. 
 13 See infra Parts II–III. 
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the most public controversy of the 86 rules the SEC was tasked with writing 
under Dodd-Frank. During a multi-stage, seven-year rulemaking process, the 
SEC received over 2,000 unique comment letters and over 320,000 form let-
ters about the rule from a wide range of stakeholders. Without any legislative 
history to go by and under constant pressure from ardent opponents and pro-
ponents of pay ratio disclosure, the SEC had to work to fit the congressional 
mandate within the existing tapestry of federal securities regulation. To do so, 
the SEC justified the rule with reference to informing investors’ say-on-pay 
voting decisions, and sought to minimize the costs of compliance by afford-
ing firms broad flexibility in calculating the pay ratio.14 
A close examination of the political dialogue and rulemaking process 
reveals that stakeholders have ascribed several different functions to the rule, 
in addition to or in lieu of, the informational function that the SEC endorsed. 
One of these is a behavioral function—the pay ratio as a means of influencing 
corporate decisionmaking in substantive ways. For example, the disclosure 
requirement could in theory induce firms to improve their pay ratio by reduc-
ing CEO pay or increasing median worker pay, or, more generally, encourage 
them to devote more attention to employee compensation matters. Another is 
a public discourse function—the pay ratio as a means of fostering or contrib-
uting to a public conversation about economy-wide pay inequities and eco-
nomic inequality more broadly. The informational, behavioral, and public 
discourse functions are not exclusive of one another, and this overall ambigui-
ty about the rule’s functions is an important part of understanding the rule 
itself.15 
Our assessment of the pay ratio’s effectiveness takes these different 
functions into account. We find that the pay ratio rule is ineffectual and poten-
tially counterproductive in fulfilling an informational or a behavioral function 
due to its low informational integrity—the inherent lack of accuracy, difficul-
ty in interpretation, and incompleteness of the information. The pay ratio’s 
high public salience does nothing to help in this regard. On the flipside, high 
public salience renders the pay ratio rule more successful in fulfilling a public 
discourse function: The nature of the subject matter and the superficial sim-
plicity of the information can be very effective in attracting public attention to 
questions of pay inequity and economic inequality. The quality of the dis-
course, however, is limited by the rule’s low informational integrity.16 
Our policy proposal focuses on improving the pay ratio’s informational 
integrity and moving beyond the disclosure-as-soundbite approach. As cur-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra Parts I.B–I.C. 
 15 See infra Part I.D. 
 16 See infra Part V.B. 
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rently formulated, the rule does not require firms to provide context or expla-
nation for the disclosed pay ratio numbers. In other words, in an effort to en-
sure maximum flexibility and minimize compliance costs, the SEC adopted a 
numbers-only approach to pay ratio disclosure. We suggest that the SEC 
should revisit this decision and mandate a narrative disclosure approach that 
provides information about median worker pay and the resulting pay ratio 
with more context, nuance, and explanation. Doing so would make firms’ 
disclosures easier to interpret and more complete, which should improve the 
pay ratio’s ability to fulfill an informational or a behavioral function. It could 
also improve the quality and increase the quantum of compensation-related 
information that can be used as part of public discourse. This narrative disclo-
sure approach would be in line with the format of existing disclosure re-
quirements relating to executive compensation.17 
Two brief caveats are in order. First, the pay ratio disclosure rule has 
been the target of repeated repeal efforts and remains highly controversial.18 
Though we acknowledge the various policy arguments against the rule and in 
its favor, we do not take a position on them in this Article. Instead, we assume 
that the rule will not be repealed in the near term, and seek to define its short-
comings, explain the reasons for them, and put forward a strategy for over-
coming them. Second, our analysis draws on the history of the pay ratio dis-
closure project since 2010 and on the first season of pay ratio reporting, 
which concluded in 2018. During this period, the pay ratio has generated a 
great deal of evidence, which we draw on throughout the Article. Neverthe-
less, we are still in the early days of pay ratio reporting. 
Our Article engages with two important strands of the scholarly litera-
ture. In the areas of securities regulation and corporate governance, our analy-
sis of the pay ratio disclosure project provides new evidence for debates over 
the effects and merits of important federal statutes such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which have redefined 
the corporate governance regulatory landscape over the past 16 years.19 Our 
analysis also highlights the growing heterogeneity of regulatory interventions 
in the area of executive compensation. Whereas executive compensation reg-
ulation has traditionally sought to link executive pay to shareholder returns,20 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra Part VI. 
 18 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1817 (2007); John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Gov-
ernance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1781 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
 20 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 58 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1915 (2010). 
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the CEO pay ratio for the first time links executive compensation to employ-
ee compensation, through imperfect means and to uncertain ends. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I traces the origins of the pay ratio 
disclosure requirement by presenting the history of compensation ratios, the 
adoption of the pay ratio disclosure mandate by Congress, and its subsequent 
implementation through SEC rulemaking. Drawing on this history, Part I also 
suggests three possible conceptions of the rule’s functions. Part II describes 
the architecture of the rule, the results from the first year of pay ratio report-
ing, and the reliability and comparability problems associated with the data. 
Part III shows that, despite such problems, the pay ratio disclosures have re-
ceived extensive attention from an unusually broad set of audiences: the me-
dia, national politicians, state and local governments, and other public actors, 
in addition to the traditional corporate constituencies. Part IV describes the 
low informational integrity of the pay ratio disclosure rule relative to the rest 
of the securities disclosure regime. Part V.A defines the rule’s unique disclo-
sure-as-soundbite approach as a function of its high public salience and low 
informational integrity. Part V.B offers an assessment of the rule’s effective-
ness in light of each of its possible functions. Part VI presents our proposal 
for moving beyond the disclosure-as-soundbite approach by requiring firms 
to present pay ratio information in a narrative format that provides more con-
text, nuance, and explanation. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND CHALLENGES OF THE PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE 
The implementation date of the pay ratio disclosure rule, January 1, 
2018, marked the start of the public reporting of pay ratio data from over 
3,000 U.S. public companies.21 This date also marked the end of a process 
that was remarkable in itself: a seven-year legislative and regulatory battle 
over the precise content and even survival of the Dodd-Frank pay ratio dis-
closure mandate. Though the U.S. pay ratio disclosure rule was pathbreaking 
in a number of respects, compensation ratios have a long history. This Part 
presents the historical context and then traces the evolution of the pay ratio 
disclosure rule from an abstract idea into a legal reality, and considers the 
possible functions that the rule can be viewed as fulfilling. 
                                                                                                                           
 21 The rule became “effective” on January 1, 2017, requiring public companies to disclose pay 
ratios for the fiscal year starting on or after that date. As a result, the actual pay ratio disclosures 
began appearing a year later, after January 1, 2018. We refer to January 1, 2018 as the implemen-
tation date because as late as the fall of 2017, it was still unclear whether the rule was going to 
survive. See infra Part I.C. 
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A. The History and Uses of Compensation Ratios 
How much is one’s labor worth? Over centuries of human history, there 
has been no shortage of attempts to answer this fundamental question, draw-
ing on perspectives ranging from ethics and religion, to politics and ideology, 
to economics and management science.22 Because most conceptions of value 
are relative, the answers have often relied on comparisons between different 
members of society, or different members of an economic unit, such as a firm. 
Compensation ratios offer a simple and effective way to express such com-
parisons—they show how many times more one person (or a group of per-
sons) makes compared to another. As a result of their ability to condense in-
formation, compensation ratios have been deployed in a wide variety of con-
texts. We focus on ratios showing CEO pay relative to the pay of rank-and-
file workers (who are also referred to colloquially as “typical” or “average” 
workers).23 The ways in which such ratios are used can be separated into 
three overlapping categories—descriptive, normative, and analytical—each 
with its own policy dimension. 
1. Descriptive Uses 
The most uncontroversial and, until 2018, most prevalent use of pay ra-
tios has been to illustrate societal trends and make cross-country comparisons 
in connection with debates over executive compensation and income ine-
quality. Concerns about excessive executive compensation have animated 
public discourse in the United States since the 1930s.24 What precisely consti-
tutes “excessive” pay can be up for debate, and this makes pay ratios particu-
larly useful. By relating CEO pay to rank-and-file worker pay, a pay ratio can 
provide an intuitive measuring stick, with the added advantage of showing 
trends over time. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See generally JOHN W. BUDD, LABOR RELATIONS: STRIKING A BALANCE (2017) (discuss-
ing labor relations as a means for balancing employment relationship goals and the rights of labor 
and management, as well as alternative perspectives on the nature of the employment relation-
ship). 
 23 Different methodologies use different proxies for rank-and-file, or “average,” or “typical” 
worker pay. The SEC pay ratio disclosure rule asks firms to identify the median employee and 
report that person’s compensation. See infra Part II.A. The extent to which the median worker’s 
pay is representative of the pay of the typical worker would depend on the pay distribution within 
an organization. See infra Part IV.B. More generally, a variety of different compensation ratios are 
conceptually possible; for example, in 2018, the United Kingdom implemented a rule requiring 
firms to report the ratio of the pay of male employees to that of female employees. See infra notes 
319–320 and accompanying text. 
 24 See generally Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight Over 
Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689 (2010) (tracing public con-
cerns about levels of executive compensation in the early 1930s). 
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The resulting rhetorical points can be powerful. For example, in the 
1950s U.S. executives were making about 20 times more than the average 
employee, whereas by the early 1990s they were making 120 to 150 times 
more.25 By the mid-2000s, this figure had risen to 350.26 Present-day esti-
mates vary, but one widely reported figure in 2018 was 361:1.27 Such fig-
ures can also be used to highlight how much of an outlier the United States 
is compared to countries such as Australia (93:1), Germany (147:1), Japan 
(67:1), Switzerland (148:1), or the United Kingdom (84:1).28 Policy proposals 
connected with this use of pay ratios do not set specific pay ratio targets; in-
stead, they use pay ratios to illustrate the need for action on pervasive econo-
my-wide issues, such as income inequality.29 
2. Normative Uses 
In addition to describing societal trends, compensation ratios have also 
been used to illustrate optimal levels of pay, or distribution of pay, according 
to various normative criteria. Perhaps the earliest recorded instance of pre-
senting an optimal compensation ratio comes from Plato, who argued that the 
highest-paid members of society should earn no more than five times the in-
come of the lowest-paid.30 Such normative judgments about what is optimal 
have inspired various policy proposals in modern times, in the United States 
and abroad. In 2016, Portland, Oregon passed a city ordinance imposing spe-
cial business taxes on firms with CEO-to-median worker pay ratios higher 
than 100:1.31 The same year, Israel adopted a law limiting the deductibility of 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN 
EXECUTIVES 27 (1991). 
 26 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and 
the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 324 (2009) (reporting data and not-
ing that the pay gap generated controversy both in the political realm and in corporate board-
rooms). 
 27 See infra Part III.B. 
 28 See Roberto A. Ferdman, The Pay Gap Between CEOs and Workers Is Much Worse Than You 
Realize, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/
09/25/the-pay-gap-between-ceos-and-workers-is-much-worse-than-you-realize [https://perma.cc/
AVU9-2DZF] (reporting comparative international data based on current estimates). 
 29 See, e.g., INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., A DECADE OF EXECUTIVE EXCESS: THE 1990S (1999), 
https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/1999/09/Executive-Excess-1999.pdf [https://perma.cc/M48G-
4PY9]. 
 30 See Charles Tilley, For Fair Pay, See Plato, THE GUARDIAN (June 3, 2010), https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/03/public-sector-pay-cameron-executive-bonuses [https://
perma.cc/99ES-SF44]. 
 31 See PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE ch. 7.02, § 500 (2019), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/
citycode/28807#cid_714103 [https://perma.cc/5GGN-U3DA]; see also infra notes 235–239 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of other legislative proposals from the United States, see 
infra Part III.B.2. 
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CEO pay for firms in the financial sector to 44 times the pay of their lowest-
paid worker.32 In the United Kingdom, politicians have proposed using pay 
ratios to set caps on pay for government workers and contractors.33 A 2013 
referendum in Switzerland sought to cap companies’ pay ratios at 12:1, and, 
though it ultimately failed, it attracted considerable public attention.34 
Optimal pay ratios have also been judged with reference to firm produc-
tivity: Management expert Peter Drucker thought extensively about the issue, 
advocating for ratios in the 25:1–30:1 range in 1977, and in the 15:1–20:1 
range in 1984.35 At the beginning of the twentieth century, financier J.P. Mor-
gan suggested that a 20:1 ratio would be optimal.36 (Incidentally, in 2017 the 
CEO of the eponymous firm he founded earned 364 times what the median 
worker made.)37 Individual firms have also used compensation ratios to take a 
normative stance. For a number of years, Ben & Jerry’s had a company-
mandated policy whereby the highest-paid worker would make no more than 
five times the lowest-paid worker; over time, this increased to a 17:1 pay ra-
tio.38 Before it was acquired by Amazon, Whole Foods maintained a CEO-to-
average worker pay ratio of 19:1 (which also served as a cap on CEO pay).39 
The challenge in using specific pay ratios in such normative ways is that 
there is no objective benchmark for what constitutes an optimal pay ratio, 
either overall or in a given context. It is unlikely that optimal pay ratios can 
be determined empirically. Notions of fairness likewise have multiple dimen-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Steven Scheer, Israel Passes Law to Cap Bankers’ Salaries, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-banks-wages/israel-passes-law-to-cap-bankers-salaries-id
USL5N1713AP [https://perma.cc/N2N7-X6HR]. 
 33 See May Bulman, Labour to Set a ‘Cap’ on Salaries of Top Executives in Government-
Employed Companies, Says John McDonnell, THE INDEPENDENT (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-government-employed-companies-pay-restrict-top-
executives-john-mcdonnell-manifesto-jeremy-a7691236.html [https://perma.cc/4U6P-Y975]. 
 34 See John Hooper, Switzerland Votes Against Cap on Executive Pay, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/switzerland-votes-against-cap-executive-pay 
[https://perma.cc/782W-PK67]. 
 35 See Peter F. Drucker, Is Executive Pay Excessive?, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1977, at 20; Peter 
F. Drucker, Reform Executive Pay or Congress Will, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1984, at 34. 
 36 See Rosanna Landis Weaver, Will New Pay Ratio Disclosure Lead to “Public Infamy?,” 
AS YOU SOW (Jan. 8, 2018), https://blog.asyousow.org/will-new-pay-ratio-disclosure-lead-to-
public-infamy-66e48912d062 [https://perma.cc/3YAD-X2PX]. 
 37 See Ben McLannahan, Dimon Pay Day Means a Year’s Wages for Typical JPMorgan Staff, 
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/aac3a27a-2de4-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381. 
 38 See Mitchell Weiss, A Sweet Solution to the Sticky Wage Disparity Problem, ABC NEWS 
(Aug. 10, 2013), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/companies-follow-ben-jerrys-lead-wages/story?
id=19920634. 
 39 See John Mackey, Why Sky-High CEO Pay Is Bad Business, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 17, 
2009), https://hbr.org/2009/06/why-high-ceo-pay-is-bad-business [https://perma.cc/BLW9-E4VJ]. 
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sions that would suggest different optimal pay ratios.40 There is, however, a 
perception—shared across countries and political persuasions—that the opti-
mal pay ratio is significantly lower than the actual pay ratios.41 Legislation 
utilizing specific pay ratios gives the appearance that it is acting on this 
shared public perception in a direct manner, which likely explains its endur-
ing appeal to politicians. 
3. Analytical Uses 
Pay ratios have also been used by investors and others to help analyze 
individual firms, as well as to compare firms to one another. As a policy mat-
ter, requiring firms to disclose their CEO-to-worker pay ratios can be seen as 
an effort to facilitate such analytical uses.42 Even though data about pay ratios 
in a given industry or country has been reported for some time, such data has 
not been firm-specific and has been based on estimates from national statisti-
cal agencies.43 By contrast, when public companies provide pay ratio infor-
mation pursuant to a disclosure requirement, it becomes possible to make 
firm-to-firm comparisons (even if they may be flawed). The U.S. pay ratio 
mandate, adopted in 2010, was the first example of such a disclosure re-
quirement. Since then, similar disclosure rules have been adopted in the Unit-
ed Kingdom (with effect from 2020)44 and India (with effect from 2013),45 
and have been mooted in Australia46 and at the European Union level.47 
                                                                                                                           
 40 In the area of executive and worker compensation, commentators have distinguished be-
tween distributive fairness, procedural fairness, and interactional fairness. See, e.g., Jim Bowers & 
Fred Whittlesey, Understanding Executive Pay Equity and Fairness: Ratios and Rationality, 19 
WORLDATWORK J., no. 3, 2010, at 6, 8, http://compensationventuregroup.com/wp-content/up
loads/2014/05/WorldatWork-Pay-Ratio-Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/WH5J-GQUC]. 
 41 See Sorapop Kiatpongsan & Michael I. Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A 
Universal Desire for More Equal Pay, 9 PERSP. ON PSYCH. SCI. 587, 587–88 (2014) (reporting 
evidence based on a survey of over 55,000 respondents from the United States and 39 other coun-
tries showing that the ideal ratio is significantly lower than both the public’s estimates of the actu-
al ratio and the actual ratio). 
 42 The rationale behind pay ratios could also be to change firm behavior or contribute to pub-
lic discourse. We discuss these alternatives in Part I.D. 
 43 See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 25. 
 44 See Sarah Gordon, UK Set to Force Companies to Reveal Ratio of CEO Pay to Workers, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d8e01ac4-43c1-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b; infra 
notes 319–320 and accompanying text. 
 45 See India Companies Act 2013, No. 18 of 2013, § 197(12) (2018), https://indiacode.
nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2114/1/A2013-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/55AQ-A2XK]. 
 46 See Eryk Bagshaw, Labor to Force Companies to Reveal CEO to Employee Pay Ratio, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/labor-to-
force-companies-to-reveal-ceo-to-employee-pay-ratio-20181001-p5073z.html [https://perma.cc/
WNA9-8YQY]. 
 47 In April 2014, the European Commission published a proposal to amend the Shareholder 
Rights Directive to require disclosure of the ratio between the average executive’s compensation 
 
1136 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1123 
The idea of requiring individual firms to disclose CEO-to-worker pay 
ratios has an interesting intellectual pedigree, which illustrates the analytical 
use of pay ratios and helps set the stage for our discussion of the Dodd-Frank 
pay ratio mandate. The idea was first put forward by James Cotton in a little-
known law review article published in 1997.48 Cotton drew inspiration from 
financial ratios, such as the working capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and capitali-
zation ratio, that are routinely used by investors to analyze and compare com-
panies.49 Cotton believed that compensation ratios could serve a similar pur-
pose and proposed that public companies be required to disclose three com-
pensation ratios. These ratios would present the relationship between CEO 
pay, and the average annual salary of, respectively, a firm’s top executive of-
ficers, a firm’s management employees who are not officers, and all employ-
ees.50 The SEC’s CEO-to-median worker pay ratio closely resembles the lat-
ter of Cotton’s proposed ratios with one difference—the SEC rule uses medi-
an worker pay as opposed to average worker pay. 51 According to reports, 
Cotton sent his article to policymakers, the SEC, and the American Federa-
tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) upon pub-
lication.52 Over the following decades, it appeared that the idea had gone un-
noticed, until in 2010 it unexpectedly entered the public domain, and, shortly 
thereafter, the statute book. 
B. The Congressional Pay Ratio Disclosure Mandate 
The pay ratio disclosure mandate is contained in Section 953(b) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which was signed into law in July 2010.53 The provision 
requires public companies to calculate and disclose: (a) the annual total com-
pensation of the median worker; (b) the annual total compensation of the 
                                                                                                                           
and the compensation of the average full-time employee. See European Commission Press Release 
IP/14/396, European Commission Proposes to Strengthen Shareholder Engagement and Introduce 
a “Say on Pay” for Europe’s Largest Companies (Apr. 9, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-396_en.htm [https://perma.cc/NQ85-PJ8N]. 
 48 See James A. Cotton, Toward Fairness in Compensation of Management and Labor: Com-
pensation Ratios, a Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157 (1997). 
 49 Id. at 175–78 (“It is commonly accepted in the financial world today that certain ratios are 
used regularly to evaluate the performance of a corporation and to determine how financially 
healthy it is.”). 
 50 Id. at 179–80. 
 51 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)). 
 52 Elliot Blair Smith & Phil Kuntz, CEO Pay 1,795-to-1 Multiple of Wages Skirts U.S. Law, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-30/ceo-pay-1-
795-to-1-multiple-of-workers-skirts-law-as-sec-delays. 
 53 Dodd-Frank Act, § 953(b).  
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CEO; and (c) the ratio of the two.54 The inclusion of Section 953(b) in Dodd-
Frank was almost an afterthought—the provision was not subject to debate 
and generated virtually no legislative history.55 This was not surprising: Over 
2,300 pages long, the primary goal of the Dodd-Frank Act was to address ma-
jor problems related to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, such as too-big-to-
fail, excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, insufficient coordination 
by federal financial regulators, conflicts of interest within credit rating agen-
cies, and inadequate consumer financial protections.56 Understandably, the 
far-reaching provisions responding to these problems attracted the most atten-
tion and discussion in the run-up to the Act’s adoption. 
The pay ratio disclosure mandate was part of Subtitle E of “Title IX—
Accountability and Executive Compensation” of Dodd-Frank, which con-
tained provisions requiring firms to provide additional pay-for-performance 
disclosures57 and disclosures relating to hedging policies for employees and 
directors,58 adopt so-called clawback policies for improperly awarded execu-
tive compensation,59 and hold advisory say-on-pay shareholder votes, among 
others.60 These provisions sought to align executive pay with corporate per-
formance, a redoubling of decades-long efforts in this area, and give share-
holders more voice in matters of executive compensation.61 The pay ratio 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. The pay ratio rule does not apply to certain special categories of public companies, such 
as smaller reporting companies, emerging growth companies, and foreign private issuers. Id. 
 55 See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Dodd-Frank, 
Compensation Ratios, and the Expanding Role of Shareholders in the Governance Process, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 91 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Brown-
Executive-Compensation-and-Shareholders.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ6Z-3PJA]. 
 56 See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
 57 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 953(a) (setting out pay-for-performance disclosure mandate); Pay 
Versus Performance, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-74835 (proposed Apr. 29, 2015), 80 Fed. 
Reg. 26,330 (May 7, 2015) (proposing an SEC rule seeking to implement the congressional man-
date). As of January 1, 2019, the SEC has not yet adopted this rule. 
 58 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 955 (setting out mandate for disclosure of hedging transactions 
related to company securities by employees and directors); Disclosure of Hedging by Employees, 
Officers and Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8488 (Dec. 20, 2018), 84 Fed. Reg. 2402 
(Feb. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240) (adopting an SEC rule to implement the 
congressional mandate). 
 59 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 954 (setting out the clawback policy mandate); Listing Standards 
for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9861 (July 
1, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 41,144 (proposed July 14, 2015) (proposing an SEC rule seeking to imple-
ment the congressional mandate). As of January 1, 2019, the SEC has not yet adopted this rule. 
 60 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 951 (setting out the say-on-pay mandate); Shareholder Approval of 
Executive Compensation, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 
6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (adopting an SEC rule establishing the say-on-pay regime). 
 61 See Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. HEADNOTES 14, 16 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/BankGeorgiev_PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHD8-RRNC]. 
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mandate looked like an outlier in this context, because it was not immediately 
clear how it furthered either goal. Instead, it appeared to share more similarity 
with other highly specific and unorthodox disclosure mandates contained in 
Dodd-Frank, which pertained to conflict minerals and mine safety.62 
The first legislative appearance of the pay ratio disclosure concept was 
in the Corporate Executive Accountability Act of 2010, introduced by Senator 
Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, in February 2010.63 This bill was 
subsequently subsumed by the mammoth Dodd-Frank Act. None of Senator 
Menendez’ statements in connection with either bill addressed the specific 
purpose of the pay ratio mandate.64 The Senate Report on the Dodd-Frank 
Act noted only in general terms that the goal of the bill’s executive compen-
sation provisions was to “empower[] shareholders in a public company to 
have a greater voice on executive compensation and to have more fairness in 
compensation affairs.”65 The views of several senators in the Republican mi-
nority at the time did mention the pay ratio in passing and criticized it for 
playing into “popular notions that [CEO] salaries are too high,”66 and for pav-
ing the way for the pursuit of “‘social justice’ in income distribution.”67 
Though the pay ratio disclosure mandate did not generate any meaning-
ful debate or stakeholder input before its adoption, it did so afterwards. The 
provision was swiftly criticized by business associations and lobbyists such as 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 1502 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)) (conflict minerals disclo-
sure); Dodd-Frank Act, § 1503 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m-2) (mine safety disclosure). 
 63 S. 3049, 111th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/
senate-bill/3049 [https://perma.cc/XR9D-P5VC]. The bill’s preamble noted that its goal was “[t]o 
give shareholders a vote on executive pay, to hold executives accountable for failure or fraud, to 
structure executive pay to encourage the long-term viability of companies, and for other purpos-
es.” Id. 
 64 In a press release on the proposed Corporate Executive Accountability Act of 2010, Senator 
Menendez stated: “What everyone has learned all too painfully over the past year and a half is that 
risky behavior, excesses, and a lack of accountability on Wall Street can end up squeezing fami-
lies on Main Street . . . . Corporate executives must be held accountable, and that is the purpose of 
this legislation.” See Press Release, Office of Senator Bob Menendez, Menendez Aims to Hold 
Corporate Executives Accountable with New Bill (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.menendez.senate.
gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-aims-to-hold-corporate-executives-accountable-with-new-
bill [https://perma.cc/N5YE-D6XE]. 
 65 See COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URB. AFF., RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL 
STABILITY ACT OF 2010, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 37 (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.congress.gov/
congressional-report/111th-congress/senate-report/176/1 [https://perma.cc/8GUL-NALP]. 
 66 Id. at 245 (reporting on minority views). 
 67 156 CONG. REC. 8843 (2010) (statement of Sen. Shelby) (“The grab bag includes puzzling 
items, like a . . . provision that requires disclosure of the ratio of the median employee’s compen-
sation to the chief executive officer’s compensation. It looks to me like the way is being paved to 
achieve so-called ‘social justice’ in income distribution. This is another disturbing example of the 
government getting its nose under the private sector’s tent.”). 
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the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.68 Between 2011 and 2017, five separate 
bills were introduced in the House of Representatives to repeal the pay ratio 
mandate.69 One of them, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, passed through 
the House but was not taken up by the Senate.70 Repealing the pay ratio man-
date was also high on the list of recommended regulatory rollbacks contained 
in a special report prepared by the Treasury Department in October 2017.71 
So far, the pay ratio has survived these repeal efforts. Further, even though 
Congress was eventually successful in passing a bill rolling back some of 
Dodd-Frank’s most significant provisions, the pay ratio mandate was not in-
cluded in that bill.72 
These efforts to delegitimize and repeal the pay ratio mandate were 
countered by sustained efforts to ensure its implementation. The SEC rule-
making process generated hundreds of thousands of letters from investors and 
the public in support of the pay ratio provision.73 In addition, members of 
Congress wrote numerous letters to the SEC urging it to speed up the rule’s 
adoption. Statements contained in these letters provide a glimpse into legisla-
tive intent, even if some of it may have been determined retroactively. Such 
statements, however, do not resolve fully the underlying ambiguity about the 
goals Congress aimed to achieve through the pay ratio disclosure mandate. 
Our review of letters written by members of Congress who were in-
volved in the passage of Dodd-Frank suggests two broad justifications for the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Dina ElBoghdady, Dodd-Frank Executive Pay Rule Still in Lim-
bo Amid Pushback from Corporate America, WASH. POST (July 6, 2013), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-07-06/politics/40404900_1_rule-financial-overhaul-legislation-agency 
[https://perma.cc/T3G7-9PJZ]; see also Letter from Am. Benefits Council & 23 Other Industry 
Groups and Associations to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Regarding Sec-
tion 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Jan. 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Am. Benefits Council et al. Letter], http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/2012-1.18-Trades-Ltr-to-SEC-re-pay-ratio-rules1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DTT3-MZ5R]. 
 69 Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (introduced Apr. 26, 2017); Finan-
cial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (introduced Sept. 9, 2016); Burdensome Data 
Collection Relief Act, H.R. 414, 114th Cong. (introduced Jan. 20, 2015); Burdensome Data Col-
lection Relief Act, H.R. 1135, 113th Cong. (introduced Mar. 13, 2013); Burdensome Data Collec-
tion Relief Act, H.R. 1062, 112th Cong. (introduced Mar. 14, 2011). 
 70 See Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking Rules Passes in House, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/business/dealbook/house-financial-
regulations-dodd-frank.html [https://perma.cc/L95Q-RRX7]. 
 71 See Andrew Ackerman & Gabriel T. Rubin, Trump Administration Calls for Scrapping 
CEO Pay Rule, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-
proposes-wide-ranging-rethink-of-market-regulations-1507298400 [https://perma.cc/M436-7LLJ]. 
 72 See Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Big Dodd-Frank Rollback, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/congress-passes-dodd-
frank-rollback-for-smaller-banks.html [https://perma.cc/3WDT-825Y]. 
 73 See infra notes 80–115 and accompanying text. 
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pay ratio disclosure mandate. The first stems from concerns over income ine-
quality and focuses primarily on workers, rather than investors. According to 
this view, the pay ratio disclosures are meant to relate runaway executive 
compensation to stagnant worker wages and thereby highlight income ine-
quality. For example, a 2012 letter to the SEC from Senator Menendez and 
four other senators, in which they requested swift action on the pay ratio 
mandate, discussed historical trends in income inequality, and noted that the 
pay ratio mandate “was intended to shine a light on [pay disparity] figures 
. . . at each company.”74 In another letter to the SEC, Senator Menendez wrote 
that “[a]t a time when companies are laying off workers, employees deserve 
to know whether their executives are sharing proportionally in any sacrific-
es.”75 Statements by Senator Menendez during a Senate Banking Committee 
hearing in 2013 carried a similar motif.76 These concerns resonate in some of 
the unusual ways the actual pay ratio disclosures have been used in the public 
realm, which we discuss in Part III. 
Members of Congress also offered a second justification for the pay ra-
tio, which focused more closely on investors. In a nutshell, the argument was 
that the goal of the pay ratio mandate is to provide investors with information 
about firms’ pay practices, because this information is material to investors. 
To support this point, Senator Menendez and 36 other members of Congress 
noted in a 2017 letter to the SEC that investors can use the pay ratio infor-
mation to determine the “fairness” of a company’s compensation structure, 
which in turn would inform investors’ advisory say-on-pay votes.77 The same 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Letter from Senator Robert Menendez et al. to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Mar. 8, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/
executivecompensation-313.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6HZ-YNZC] (“[I]ncome inequality is a growing 
concern among many Americans. Incomes at the very top have skyrocketed in recent years while 
workers’ wages and incomes have stagnated. In fact, over the last decade, median family income 
actually fell for the first time since the Great Depression.”). 
 75 Letter from Senator Robert Menendez to Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Jan. 19. 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/
executivecompensation-59.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F2A-235N]. 
 76 See Press Release, Office of Senator Bob Menendez, Menendez Calls on SEC to Expedite 
Adoption of CEO-to-Median Pay Disclosure Rule (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.menendez.
senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-calls-on-sec-to-expedite-adoption-of-ceo-to-median-
pay-disclosure-rule [https://perma.cc/Q6TU-H9AL] [hereinafter Menendez Press Release] (“In-
come inequality is a real, growing concern in our nation, as it should be. We have middle class 
Americans that have gone years without seeing a raise, while CEO pay is soaring . . . . And the 
excuse used by the industry that this rule is too costly and too burdensome for companies just 
doesn’t pass muster when their CEOs are raking in multi-million dollar bonuses. What’s too costly 
here are the big paydays for CEOs. And the burden is falling on workers with stagnant wages.”). 
 77 Letter from Senator Robert Menendez et al. to Michael Piwowar, Acting Chairman, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/cll3-
1660758-148835.pdf [https://perma.cc/T45N-AKT7] (“This pay ratio information will benefit 
investors by giving them valuable information for ascertaining whether company employees are 
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letter argued that the information is relevant to investors because high pay 
ratios are associated with “the kind of risky investments that brought on the 
global financial crisis.”78 The letter also linked investor concerns to broader 
societal concerns by noting that “paying CEOs hundreds of times more than 
the typical employees hurts working families, is detrimental to employee mo-
rale, and goes against what research shows is best for business,” and that such 
pay practices “contribut[e] to stunning widening of economic inequality.”79 
Whereas the first post-enactment justification for the pay ratio disclosure 
mandate may better reflect the primary concerns that drove its adoption, the 
second justification places the pay ratio disclosure mandate more squarely 
within the purview of the SEC disclosure regime. The emphasis on investor 
concerns was no doubt strategic, because it made it more likely that the SEC 
would continue to pursue the rule. In addition, the investor-focused approach 
mirrored the SEC’s own framing of the pay ratio disclosure mandate during 
the multi-stage implementation process, which we turn to next. 
C. The SEC Pay Ratio Rulemaking Process 
Even though Congress was highly prescriptive with respect to the format 
of the required pay ratio disclosures, it left it to the SEC to write the actual 
rule. The rulemaking process, which started in 2010 and did not end until 
2017, was highly contentious, splitting SEC Commissioners along political 
lines and generating a level of public engagement that was virtually unprece-
dented in the 85-year history of the SEC.80 The pay ratio rule was one of 86 
rules that the SEC was tasked with writing pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
including 13 rules in the area of executive compensation and corporate gov-
ernance.81 
Soon after the Dodd-Frank Act became law, the SEC began receiving 
pressure from proponents of the rule, who sought speedy implementation,82 
                                                                                                                           
fairly compensated and help them decide how to cast their ‘say-on-pay’ advisory votes on execu-
tive compensation.”). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 The pay ratio rule likely ranks behind a rulemaking petition urging the SEC to adopt a 
disclosure rule on corporate political spending. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Hindering the S.E.C. from Shining a Light on Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/business/dealbook/hindering-the-sec-from-shining-a-light-
on-political-spending.html [https://perma.cc/5HZF-BEC6] (noting that the SEC has received more 
than 1.2 million comments on the proposal). 
 81 See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml [https://
perma.cc/63SR-GGNJ]. As of January 1, 2019, the SEC had implemented 68 of the 86 rule-
makings, and 8 out of the 13 executive compensation and corporate governance ones. 
 82 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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and from opponents of the rule, who urged the SEC to delay it.83 For the most 
part, the rule’s proponents put forward the income inequality and investor 
interest arguments discussed in Part I.B. The rule’s opponents, on the other 
hand, argued that there would be “significant hurdles and burdens” associated 
with compliance.84 They also suggested holding a roundtable with the busi-
ness community, or subjecting the rule to rigorous Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) review—measures aimed at highlighting the 
costs of compliance.85 Even before it started implementing the pay ratio rule, 
the SEC had received 260 unique comment letters, which expressed a multi-
tude of views and concerns.86 Public support for the not-yet-proposed rule 
was strong: The SEC received approximately 22,600 form letters and a peti-
tion with approximately 84,700 signatories in favor of the pay ratio.87 Opin-
ions in the popular press on the merits of the rule were also divided.88 
The SEC issued a proposing release for the pay ratio rule in September 
2013. The release highlighted the rule’s ambiguities and the numerous meth-
odological challenges associated with identifying the median employee, de-
termining median worker pay, and calculating the pay ratio.89 The SEC also 
noted, with some skepticism, that “neither the statute nor the related legisla-
tive history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the provision 
or a specific market failure, if any, that is intended to be remedied.”90 As a 
result, though very extensive, the agency’s cost-benefit analysis in the propos-
ing release was inconclusive; at times, it also appeared to place the burden on 
proponents of the rule to identify and quantify the specific benefits of imple-
menting a rule that the SEC was in any event required to implement pursuant 
to Dodd-Frank.91 Overall, the release asked for stakeholder input on 69 de-
                                                                                                                           
 83 See, e.g., Am. Benefits Council et al. Letter, supra note 68 (presenting arguments against 
the pay ratio disclosure rule and other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 84 Id. at 3. 
 85 Id. at 4. 
 86 Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9452 (proposed Sept. 18, 2013), 78 
Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,561 n.9 (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-01/pdf/
2013-23073.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NLJ-W9F2] [hereinafter Pay Ratio Proposing Release]. 
 87 Id. at 60,561. 
 88 See Editorial, Overpaid? Or Worth Every Penny?, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/14/opinion/sunday/overpaid-or-worth-every-penny.html [https://perma.cc/
A2HN-FULP] (expressing optimism about the rule’s effectiveness); Steven Davidoff Solomon, A 
Simple Solution That Made a Hard Problem More Difficult, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/a-simple-solution-that-made-a-hard-problem-more-difficult 
[https://perma.cc/C4TD-PLHA] (discussing the various problems associated with the pay ratio 
disclosure mandate). 
 89 Pay Ratio Proposing Release, supra note 86. 
 90 Id. at 60,582. 
 91 Id. at 60,582–99. 
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tailed questions pertaining to every aspect of the rule.92 The rule proposal 
divided the SEC, with three Commissioners voting in support, and two 
against.93 SEC Chair Mary Jo White emphasized that the agency’s approach 
in the proposed rule sought to provide companies with significant flexibility 
to ease the burdens of compliance.94 
The SEC faced additional political pressure after the release of the pro-
posed rule: Republican members of Congress demanded to know how much 
time the SEC was spending on the pay ratio rule and urged the SEC to priori-
tize other rulemaking; Democratic members of Congress pressured the SEC 
to continue with the rule’s implementation.95 Industry groups mobilized fur-
ther in opposition to the rule, and argued that the total annual compliance 
costs for all affected companies would be “egregious” at $710.9 million.96 
Proponents of the rule organized a form letter writing campaign which gener-
ated over 285,000 letters in support.97 Separately, the SEC received over 
1,540 individual comment letters from members of the public, investors, 
companies, industry associations, and other stakeholders; these letters once 
again expressed a wide variety of views.98 
The SEC adopted the final pay ratio rule on a split three-to-two vote in 
August 2015, two years after issuing the proposal.99 The final rule provided 
firms with additional methodological flexibility in making the relevant calcu-
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. 
 93 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules for Pay Ratio Disclo-
sure (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-186 [https://perma.cc/SVF2-
X5WP]. 
 94 Id. (“This proposal would provide companies significant flexibility in complying with the 
disclosure requirement while still fulfilling the statutory mandate . . . . We are very interested in 
receiving comments on the proposed approach and the flexibility it affords.”). 
 95 See Cydney Posner, How Many Hours Does It Take to Create Pay-Ratio Rules?, COOLEY 
PUBCO (Dec. 18, 2014), https://cooleypubco.com/2014/12/18/how-many-hours-does-it-take-to-
create-pay-ratio-rules [https://perma.cc/GJ4D-AQ5W]. 
 96 IKE BRANNON, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF 
THE SEC’S PAY-RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION 7 (2014), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DTA-
XVS4] (reporting data based on a survey of covered companies). 
 97 See Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9877, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, at 
50,108 (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-08-18/pdf/2015-19600.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8YQF-7QM5] [hereinafter Pay Ratio Adopting Release]. 
 98 See id. at 50,108–09. 
 99 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, 
Aug. 5, 2015, https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [https://perma.cc/NW3Z-
KX3M]. The two Democratic Commissioners and the SEC Chair voted in favor, while the two 
Republican Commissioners voted against. 
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lations.100 Similar to the 2013 proposing release, the 2015 adopting release 
noted that the objectives or intended benefits of the rule are unclear from the 
statute or legislative history.101 This time, however, the SEC took a more con-
crete view of how the pay ratio disclosure rule fits within the existing execu-
tive compensation regulatory framework. 
The SEC stated that it believed, “based on [an] analysis of the statute 
and comments received, that Section 953(b) was intended to provide share-
holders with a company-specific metric that can assist in their evaluation of 
[the company’s] executive compensation practices,”102 and that the pay ratio 
disclosure “may provide a more useful or relevant data point for shareholders 
making their say-on-pay votes . . . .”103 The SEC also noted that the pay ratio 
data may be useful to investors in making their investment decisions.104 This 
statement of the goals of the rule is notable as much for what it did not say as 
for what it did. There is no discussion of income inequality, suggesting that 
the SEC did not think that pay ratio disclosures were intended to highlight 
income inequality.105 In addition, the SEC emphasized that pay ratio disclo-
sures are firm-specific and not suitable for comparisons across firms.106 As 
we show in Part III, however, the actual use of the pay ratio data during the 
2018 reporting season contravenes these precepts. 
A final twist in the story of the implementation of the pay ratio rule 
came in February 2017, when the then-Acting SEC Chair, Michael Piwowar, 
issued a statement soliciting detailed public comments from firms on whether 
they were experiencing any “unexpected challenges” in complying with the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See infra Part II. In line with general practice, smaller reporting companies, emerging 
growth companies, and foreign companies with SEC reporting obligations were exempted from 
compliance with the rule. 
 101 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,150. 
 102 Id. Elsewhere in the release, the SEC affirmed its belief that this is “the primary benefit 
that Congress intended with pay ratio disclosure.” Id. at 50,149. 
 103 Id. at 50,137. 
 104 Id. at 50,114 (“[A]lthough we understand the primary purpose of the pay ratio disclosure 
to be to inform shareholder’s say-on-pay votes . . . , we acknowledge that some commenters indi-
cated the disclosure could be useful to investors in making investment decisions.”). 
 105 The SEC Pay Ratio Adopting Release mentions “income inequality” and “inequitable 
wealth distribution” only when summarizing the public comments it received. Id. at 50,109, 
50,153. 
 106 Id. at 50,106 (“[W]e believe the final pay ratio rule should be designed to allow sharehold-
ers to better understand and assess a particular [company’s] compensation practices and pay ratio 
disclosures rather than to facilitate a comparison of this information from one [company] to anoth-
er.”). The SEC reiterated this point in the 2017 guidance release on the pay ratio disclosure rule. 
See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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rule.107 Acting Chair Piwowar also directed the SEC staff to “reconsider the 
implementation of the rule” based on the comments received, and to deter-
mine whether additional guidance or regulatory relief would be appropri-
ate.108 This move was as controversial as it was unusual.109 After all, 
Piwowar’s status at the helm of the agency was temporary and he was outvot-
ed by the other Commissioners when the rule was adopted by the SEC in 
2015 (which had prompted him to issue two vehement dissents).110 
This additional rulemaking round generated a new set of comments: 
over 230 unique comment letters and over 14,000 form letters.111 Firms and 
industry associations argued for additional flexibility.112 Investors, legislators, 
and members of the public wrote in support of the rule, using the same argu-
ments and intensity as in prior rounds.113 Meanwhile, a new SEC Chair was 
confirmed in May 2017, and he expressed no interest in a political battle over 
the pay ratio disclosure rule or the similarly-controversial conflict minerals 
disclosure rule, which had also been placed under review.114 In September 
2017, the SEC staff concluded the pay ratio review by issuing additional 
technical guidance on making the relevant calculations.115 This completed the 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Acting Chairman Michael S. Piwowar, Public Statement on Reconsideration of Pay Ratio 
Rule Implementation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
statement/reconsideration-of-pay-ratio-rule-implementation.html [https://perma.cc/KQ4L-FMEY]. 
 108 Id. 
 109 The move prompted a letter from four senators demanding that the SEC’s Inspector Gen-
eral investigate Piwowar’s actions. See Letter from Senators Sherrod Brown, Elizabeth Warren, 
Robert Menendez and Brian Schatz to the Hon. Carl W. Hoecker, SEC Inspector General (Mar. 
29, 2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017_03_29_SEC_IG_letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B63D-UNMP]. 
 110 See Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/
dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/HL4N-QSVJ] 
[hereinafter Piwowar Dissenting Comments]; see also Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Addition-
al Dissenting Comments on Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/additional-dissenting-statement-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html 
[https://perma.cc/2LNY-CXH2]. 
 111 See Comments on the Statement on the Commission’s Pay Ratio Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/payratiostatement.
htm [https://perma.cc/JE7K-LN25]. 
 112 See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey Shuman, Senior Vice President, Quest Diagnostics, to Mi-
chael S. Piwowar, Acting Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.
sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/cll3-1666293-148965.pdf [https://perma.cc/W96Q-JBR8] 
(asking the SEC to limit the rule’s applicability to U.S. employees only).  
 113 See Comments on the Statement on the Commission’s Pay Ratio Rule, supra note 111. 
 114 See Laura Anthony, SEC Announces Regulatory Agenda, HUFFPOST (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sec-announces-regulatory-agenda_us_59c96473e4b0b70
22a646ce3 [https://perma.cc/UQZ9-HDYX]. 
 115 Commission Guidance on Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-10415, 82 
Fed. Reg. 44,917 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2017/33-10415.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FC46-MX5M] [hereinafter Pay Ratio Guidance Release]; Division of Corpora-
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seven-year SEC rulemaking process, and, shortly thereafter, over 3,000 U.S. 
public companies started reporting their CEO-to-median worker pay ratios.  
D. The Rule’s Function: Three Possible Conceptions 
Our discussion of the origins of the pay ratio disclosure rule would be 
incomplete without exploring a fundamental question that can easily become 
obscured by the official framing of the pay ratio during the rulemaking pro-
cess: What function, or functions, is the pay ratio disclosure rule supposed to 
fulfill? 
Recall that the SEC justified the pay ratio rule with reference to inves-
tors’ say-on-pay voting decisions.116 In letters to the SEC, however, the origi-
nator of the pay ratio mandate, Senator Menendez, spoke about the pay ratio’s 
importance both in terms of shining light on income inequality for the benefit 
of employees, and helping investors evaluate the fairness of firms’ compensa-
tion practices.117 Stakeholders have offered a number of alternative views of 
the pay ratio—sometimes even offering one interpretation as part of the offi-
cial process and a different one when speaking to broader constituencies.118 In 
their criticism, opponents of the pay ratio have also suggested a variety of 
different conceptions of the rule.119 In short, the public understanding of the 
pay ratio rule and its functions can be characterized as polyphonic, and even 
discordant. 
We have identified three possible functions that the pay ratio could be 
expected to fulfill: an informational function, a behavioral function, and a 
public discourse function. Stakeholders’ true views of the pay ratio, which are 
unobservable, could reflect one or a combination of these functions (or, in-
deed, some other possible function). In Part V, we consider—based on the 
evidence and analysis presented in this Article—the extent to which the pay 
ratio is fulfilling these functions. 
We do not attempt to determine the “right” function, because this is a 
question involving legislative history, which in the pay ratio’s case is inde-
terminate, and policy preferences, which are always contingent. By exploring 
                                                                                                                           
tion Finance Guidance on Calculation of Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/guidance-calculation-pay-ratio-
disclosure [https://perma.cc/2XQ8-JNX9]. 
 116 See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
 117 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
 118 See supra note 113 and infra note 127, and accompanying text (using the AFL-CIO as an 
example). 
 119 See, e.g., Piwowar Dissenting Comments, supra note 110 (arguing that the pay ratio rule 
does not provide investors with material information and that it seeks to influence the levels of 
executive compensation). 
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the full variety of possible functions of the pay ratio instead, we seek to map 
out the multiple possible social constructions of the pay ratio disclosure rule 
and the grounds on which the contests over its meaning and legitimacy are 
being held.120 
1. Informational Function 
The conception of the pay ratio disclosure rule as a means of generating 
information to be used by investors fits neatly within the framework of the 
securities disclosure regime. At its most basic, disclosure is about providing 
investors with information, and there is no controversy over whether this con-
stitutes a legitimate function for a securities disclosure rule. 
Viewing the pay ratio through an investor information lens was the saf-
est, and likely the only, way the SEC could approach the rule in the absence 
of specific instructions from Congress as to the rule’s purpose. This framing 
by the SEC in turn determined the way stakeholders discussed the rule during 
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Opponents of the rule asserted 
that investors would not find the pay ratio information useful, or material, 
based on the low level of interest investors had previously expressed in such 
information.121 Proponents of the rule, including the hundreds of thousands of 
form comment letters, asserted that investors need the information the pay 
ratio would provide.122 Comment letters by the AFL-CIO, a strong supporter 
of the rule, focused exclusively on the pay ratio’s informational benefits, cit-
ing a variety of economic studies showing the relevance of compensation-
related information to investors.123 
2. Behavioral Function 
Instead of, or in addition to, providing investors with information, the 
pay ratio disclosure rule could be seen as a way to influence corporate deci-
                                                                                                                           
 120 In this respect, the pay ratio disclosure rule bears resemblance to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, which was similarly controversial upon its adoption and which also underwent a lengthy 
period of contestation. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 1944 (discussing the social construction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 121 See, e.g., Letter from David T. Hirschmann, President and CEO, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. 
Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-567.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7WG9-L6RF]. 
 122 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,150–52. 
 123 See, e.g., Letter from Brandon J. Rees, Deputy Director, Office of Investment, AFL-CIO, to 
Michael S. Piwowar, Acting Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.
sec.gov/comments/pay-ratio-statement/cll3-1661366-148849.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRY5-GSRH] 
(citing studies suggesting that high pay ratios inhibit teamwork and lead to lower job satisfaction 
and morale, higher employee turnover, reduced productivity and inferior product quality). 
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sionmaking in substantive ways. For example, the fact that firms are required 
to publicly disclose their median worker pay figures, as well as the ratio of 
CEO pay to median worker pay, may induce them to make the figures look 
more acceptable to investors, employees, or other stakeholders. They could 
do so by increasing median worker pay, reducing CEO pay, or doing both at 
the same time. In addition, disclosure may lead board compensation commit-
tees, which deal primarily with executive compensation, to focus more closely 
on the levels and structure of employee pay. Though less common, securities 
disclosure rules with a behavioral function are not outside the norm.124 
Both supporters and detractors of the pay ratio disclosure rule have re-
ferred to its potential behavioral function. For example, Senator Menendez 
noted that “by requiring companies to disclose just how much, and how 
skewed, CEO pay can be, there’s a strong possibility they’ll think more about 
their compensation structures.”125 This thread was also evident in a number of 
the comment letters to the SEC.126 It also appears in statements made outside 
of the rulemaking process: Prior to the rule’s adoption, the AFL-CIO website 
noted that “[d]isclosing this pay ratio will shame companies into lowering 
CEO pay.”127 This “name and shame” rationale has also been acknowledged 
by opponents of the rule, who have used it to argue against the rule’s legiti-
macy.128 For its part, the SEC took the position that the pay ratio is not meant 
to fulfill a “name and shame” function.129 Overall, the behavioral conception 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Consider, for example, two provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Sec-
tion 406 requires companies to disclose whether they have a code of ethics for senior officers, and, 
if not, why not; this practically guarantees that all companies will adopt a code of ethics. Section 
407 requires companies to disclose whether at least one financial expert serves on the board audit 
committee, and, if not, why not; again, this practically guarantees that virtually all companies will 
have such an expert. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 406, 407, 116 Stat. 
745, 789–90 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7263–7265 (2012)). 
 125 See Menendez Press Release, supra note 76. 
 126 See, e.g., Comment Letter Type L on Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(July 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-1571.htm [https://perma.cc/3J3V-
5JEM] (“Disclosing corporate pay disparities will discourage lavish CEO pay practices that re-
ward recklessness and greed—and that fueled the 2008 economic crash.”). 
 127 See Jena McGregor, What if We Knew How Much CEOs Made vs. Their Workers?, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2013/08/22/what-if-
we-knew-how-much-ceos-made-vs-their-workers [https://perma.cc/4XNR-E39Q] (quoting the AFL-
CIO website); see also Peter Schroeder, Disputed Rule Intended to Shame CEOs, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/208161-disputed-rule-intended-to-shame-ceos [https://
perma.cc/D9AD-MC2R] (“They will be embarrassed, and that’s the whole point,” quoting a 
statement on the pay ratio rule by an AFL-CIO official). 
 128 See, e.g., Piwowar Dissenting Comments, supra note 110 (writing that “the pay ratio dis-
closure is a blatant attempt to limit executive compensation”). 
 129 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,106 n.20 (“We note that some com-
menters contended that the pay ratio disclosure is intended to publicly ‘shame’ registrants con-
cerning the size of the disparity between their CEO’s compensation and their typical worker’s 
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of the pay ratio rule echoes a hope that critics of high CEO pay have ex-
pressed many times in the past, namely that executive compensation disclo-
sure rules might help reduce CEO pay.130 
3. Public Discourse Function 
The pay ratio disclosure rule can also be conceived of in ways that have 
little to do with investor decisionmaking or the compensation structures at the 
individual firms providing the disclosures. Instead, the rule could be viewed 
as a means of fostering or contributing to a public conversation about income 
inequality. This umbrella term could refer to the high disparities between the 
pay of rank-and-file workers and corporate executives within firms across the 
economy (pay inequity), or to broader inequalities in wealth distribution with-
in society (economic inequality).131 
An SEC-mandated pay ratio disclosure rule has the capacity to facilitate 
this public conversation in two powerful ways: First, it generates information 
from companies that are household names to illustrate pay disparities; this is 
potentially more effective rhetorically than using pay ratio estimates covering 
the entire economy, which have been available for decades.132 Second, an 
SEC pay ratio rule potentially ensures that the public conversation would take 
place every year, because the disclosures are provided on an annual basis, and 
that the conversation would last several months, because firms release their 
annual reports at different times. The CEO pay information released under 
                                                                                                                           
compensation. . . . [W]e have reached a different conclusion based on principles of statutory con-
struction and have taken no such objective into account in framing the rule.”). 
 130 Evidence based on the disclosure of executive compensation information over the past 
decades suggests that disclosure rules have not led firms to reduce CEO pay. To the contrary, 
disclosure may have helped drive CEO pay up, because it makes it easier for firms to determine 
the average pay for a peer group and construct an above-average pay package in order to attract or 
retain CEOs. See generally Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer 
Groups and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487 (2013) (suggesting 
that the rise in executive compensation is due to the standard benchmarking practice of comparing 
CEO pay to peer groups and that disclosure requirements have not led to reduced CEO pay). We 
cannot, however, automatically draw the conclusion that the same effect will obtain in the case of 
the pay ratio disclosure rule, because—for the first time—firms are required to disclose median 
worker pay and relate CEO pay to it. 
 131 These concepts do not have universally-agreed definitions; we discuss them further in Part 
V.B.3. 
 132 See Lawrence Mishel, The CEO-to-Worker Compensation Ratio in 2012 of 273 Was Far 
Above That of the Late 1990s and 14 Times the Ratio of 20.1 in 1965, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 
24, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-ceo-to-worker-compensation-ratio-in-2012-of-273/ 
[https://perma.cc/UH7W-HYH3]. 
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existing rules has always generated media and public interest.133 By relating 
CEO pay to the pay of rank-and-file workers, however, the new pay ratio dis-
closures could amplify the conversation, or even change its tenor. 
Setting aside the legitimacy and normative desirability of this strategy, 
there is evidence that the pay ratio was originally viewed as fulfilling a public 
discourse function, at least in part. The early statements of Senator Menen-
dez, made before the SEC framed the pay ratio exclusively with reference to 
investor decisionmaking, contain lengthy discussions of income inequality.134 
A congressional critic of the pay ratio provision at the time of its adoption 
conceptualized it in similar terms.135 The Dodd-Frank Act itself was adopted 
at a time of economic uncertainty and sought to address the worst economic 
crisis in generations. Separately, the use of the actual pay ratio disclosure data 
during the 2018 reporting season, which we discuss in Part III, suggests that 
the pay ratio may be taking on a public discourse meaning among certain 
constituencies. 
II. RULE DESIGN, INITIAL EVIDENCE, AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
Implementing the pay ratio disclosure rule was challenging for the SEC 
due to the nature of the Dodd-Frank mandate, which was highly prescriptive 
in terms of format, but vague in various other respects. In this Part, we de-
scribe the design of the pay ratio rule, the results from the first year of pay 
ratio reporting, and the reasons why individual firms’ pay ratios may not be 
reliable and why they are not fit for comparison with the ratios of other firms. 
The reliability and comparability problems are due in part to the inevitable 
operational differences among firms, and in part to the significant methodo-
logical flexibility that the SEC built into the rule. We illustrate these points 
with examples from the 2018 pay ratio disclosures of various firms. (Prelimi-
nary results from the 2019 reporting season that became available as the Arti-
cle went to press suggest that the disclosure trends, approaches, and problems 
discussed in this Part remain unchanged during the second year of pay ratio 
reporting).136 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., John E. Core, Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, The Power of the Pen and Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2008) (discussing the role of the press in monitoring 
and influencing executive compensation). 
 134 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 135 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 136 See ERIC HOSKEN ET AL., COMP. ADVISORY PARTNERS, A DEEP DIVE INTO THE SECOND 
YEAR OF CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURES (2019), https://www.capartners.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/08/CAPintel-19-04-10-CEO-Pay-Ratio-v2.pdf. 
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A. The SEC’s Interpretation of the Congressional Pay Ratio Mandate 
As a math problem, the CEO-to-median worker pay ratio is simple to 
calculate. For example, if the total compensation for the company’s CEO is $1 
million and the median employee makes $50,000, the pay ratio is 20:1, be-
cause $1 million is 20 times greater than $50,000. What makes calculating a 
pay ratio difficult is the inputs rather than the math. The costs associated with 
compliance became apparent as soon as the pay ratio mandate was adopted by 
Congress and this generated much of the early controversy surrounding the 
rule.137 To this end, the SEC devoted significant attention throughout the 
rulemaking process to defining the inputs in ways that would be consistent 
with the congressional mandate but that also “provide flexibility in a manner 
that would reduce costs and burdens” on firms.138 This is reflected in the final 
SEC rules, which are contained in Item 402(u) of Regulation S-K, as supple-
mented by the additional guidance contained in the 2015 Pay Ratio Adopting 
Release and the 2017 Commission Guidance Release (collectively, the “regu-
lations”).139 
On the whole, the SEC afforded companies wide latitude on matters 
such as who to include in their employee population, what methodology to 
use in identifying the median employee, and how to calculate the median em-
ployee’s total compensation. The SEC also did not require firms to provide 
narrative disclosure explaining the reported figures or the factors driving 
them; instead, the regulations merely give firms the option to do so.140 Over-
all, this flexibility led to significant reductions in firms’ estimated compliance 
costs.141 It did, however, also come at the cost of reliability and comparability. 
The statutory text requires firms to take into account the annual total 
compensation of all employees in calculating the pay ratio.142 Most firms’ 
labor forces, however, are far from homogenous: In addition to full-time do-
mestic workers, they may also contain seasonal workers, part-time workers, 
and overseas workers; many firms also rely on leased workers and independ-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 138 Pay Ratio Guidance Release, supra note 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139 See Regulation S-K, Item 402(u), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2018); Pay Ratio Adopting 
Release, supra note 97; Pay Ratio Guidance Release, supra note 115. 
 140 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,107. 
 141 For example, before the SEC indicated how it will interpret the congressional mandate, 
Intel’s estimate for its annual compliance costs was in the $250,000–$500,000 range. After apply-
ing the flexible approach set out in the 2013 Proposing Release, Intel’s estimate went down by 
90%, to $15,000. See Intel Corp., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Pay Ratio Disclo-
sure Pursuant to Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-658.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PGU8-7RTL]. 
 142 Regulation S-K, Item 402(u)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2018). 
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ent contractors.143 The business models of different firms and the industries in 
which they operate require a different mix of worker categories. Including all 
of them in the definition of “employees” would reflect the most literal reading 
of the congressional mandate, but would require the most data-gathering and 
result in a median worker figure that may not contain much meaningful in-
formation.144 
After taking into account the extensive feedback of various stakeholders, 
the SEC determined that the term “employee” should cover any “individual 
employed by the [company] . . . whether as a full-time, part-time, seasonal, or 
temporary worker,” but that it would not cover leased workers or independent 
contractors.145 Foreign workers are included in this definition, subject to a 
data privacy exemption and a de minimis exemption.146 Firms are allowed to 
exclude individuals who became employees as a result of a business combi-
nation or acquisition in the fiscal year in which the transaction occurred.147 
The regulations also provide flexibility as to when the total employee popula-
tion is counted.148 
Though the term “median worker pay” has replaced it in common usage, 
the statute actually uses the term “median of the annual total compensation of 
all employees,” without elaborating how it should be determined.149 The SEC 
made a number of determinations in this context, many of which reflect its 
desire to provide firms with maximum flexibility. 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Jay Shambaugh, Ryan Nunn & Lauren Bauer, Independent Workers and the Modern 
Labor Market, BROOKINGS (June 7, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/06/07/
independent-workers-and-the-modern-labor-market [https://perma.cc/8U3G-TWRK] (discussing 
the number of American employees working in alternative employment arrangements). 
 144 See infra Part IV.B. 
 145 Regulation S-K, Item 402(u)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2018) (“The definition of 
employee . . . does not include those workers who are employed, and whose compensation is de-
termined, by an unaffiliated third party but who provide services to the registrant or its consolidat-
ed subsidiaries as independent contractors or ‘leased’ workers.”). To make things easier, the SEC 
clarified that this provision “was not intended to serve as an exclusive basis for determining 
whether a worker is an employee of the registrant” and that it would be permissible “for a regis-
trant to apply a widely recognized test under another area of law that the registrant otherwise uses 
to determine whether its workers are employees.” Pay Ratio Guidance Release, supra note 115, at 
44,918. 
 146 Under the data privacy exemption, firms may exclude workers employed in jurisdictions 
where the privacy laws prohibit disclosure of the information. Under the de minimis exception, 
firms may exclude foreign workers where they constitute less than 5% of the total employees of 
the company. See Regulation S-K, Item 402(u)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4) (2018). 
 147 Id. at Item 402(u), Instruction 7(2). 
 148 Id. at Item 402(u)(3). The calculation may be performed as of any date within the last three 
months of the company’s last completed fiscal year. Id. 
 149 Id. at Item 402(u)(1). 
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In order to determine median worker pay, a firm must first identify an 
actual median employee.150 In doing so, however, the firm does not actually 
have to find the employee who is at the exact median of its entire employee 
population. Instead, it may use what the regulations describe as “statistical 
sampling and/or other reasonable methods” so as to determine the median 
from a smaller base of employees.151 Though pay ratio disclosure is required 
on an annual basis, the exercise of identifying the median employee can be 
performed once every three years, subject to certain conditions.152 
Firms are also afforded wide flexibility in the methodology they employ 
to determine the median employee’s annual total compensation. As long as it 
uses what the regulations call a “consistently applied compensation measure” 
(“CACM”), and briefly explains the methodology and the underlying as-
sumptions, a firm has several options: It may follow the rules applicable to 
reporting executive compensation under Item 402(c)(2)(x), or, alternatively, it 
may choose to use “any other compensation measure that is consistently ap-
plied to all employees,” such as the company’s tax and/or payroll records.153 
The latter is permissible “even if those records do not include every element 
of compensation, such as equity awards widely distributed to employees.”154 
A company may also make certain adjustments in calculating employee com-
pensation, including annualizing the total compensation for permanent em-
ployees who were employed less than the full year,155 making a cost-of-living 
adjustment for employees living in a jurisdiction different than the one in 
which the CEO resides,156 and including a certain amount of personal bene-
fits.157 
B. Results from the 2018 Reporting Season 
As soon as individual firms began disclosing their pay ratio information 
for the first time in 2018, various third parties started amassing aggregate data 
and analyzing it to discern trends, make comparisons, and uncover anomalies. 
The SEC has emphasized that individual pay ratios are not comparable, and, 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,137. 
 151 Regulation S-K, Item 402(u), Instruction 4(2), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017). 
 152 Id. at Item 402(u), Instruction 2. The exercise must be carried out more frequently if there 
have been changes in the employee population or compensation arrangements that the firm be-
lieves would significantly affect its pay ratio. Id. 
 153 Id. at Item 402(u), Instructions 4(3) & 4(5). 
 154 Pay Ratio Guidance Release, supra note 138, at 44,918. 
 155 Regulation S-K, Item 402(u), Instruction 5, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017). It may not, how-
ever, annualize compensation for temporary, seasonal, or part-time employees. Id. 
 156 Id. at Item 402(u), Instruction 4(4). 
 157 Id. at Item 402(u), Instruction 4(6). The personal benefits must be less than $10,000 in the 
aggregate and the items must also be included in the CEO’s compensation. Id. 
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therefore, should not be aggregated or compared.158 For indicative purposes, 
and subject to this important caveat, we present some of the 2018 data below. 
When aggregated based on market capitalization, the 2018 pay ratios 
differ substantially. For instance, the median reported ratio for companies in 
the S&P 500 index was 155:1, whereas the median ratio in the broader Rus-
sell 3000 index was a significantly lower 70:1.159 Based on a sample of over 
2000 firms, compensation advisory firm Pearl Meyer reported an average 
ratio of 144:1, and a median ratio of 69:1.160 (As we discuss in Part III, other 
stakeholders reported different aggregate pay ratio numbers. The AFL-CIO, 
for example, reported an average pay ratio of 361:1 for firms in the S&P 
500.) 
An analysis of the data by compensation advisory firm Equilar found a 
correlation between the pay ratio and market capitalization in Russell 3000 
companies, with higher market capitalization companies reporting higher pay 
ratios (see Figure 1).161 There is a similar correlation between the pay ratio 
and total employee population, with companies with more employees report-
ing higher pay ratios (see Figure 2).162 
  
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,106. 
 159 See Ira Kay & Blaine Martin, The CEO Pay Ratio: How Should Compensation Committees 
Evaluate Their Ratios? Measuring the Impact of “Median Employee Pay,” PAY GOVERNANCE (May 
24, 2018), http://paygovernance.com/the-ceo-pay-ratio-how-should-compensation-committees-
evaluate-their-ratios-measuring-the-impact-of-median-employee-pay [https://perma.cc/6WPN-7EU2] 
(providing the median ratio for the S&P 500 index); Jessica Phan, CEO Pay Ratio: A Deep Data 
Dive, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 31, 2018), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/ceo-pay-ratio-a-deep-data-dive [https://perma.cc/MY7A-XWPY] (not-
ing the median ratio for the Russell 3000 index). 
 160 PEARL MEYER, THE CEO PAY RATIO DATA: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE 2018 PROXY SEASON 
6 (2018), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/ceo-pay-ratio-data-and-perspectives-2018-proxy-season.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q64A-PGJN]. 
 161 Phan, supra note 159.  
 * All graphs in this Article are also available online at https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/
bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-4/bank-georgiev-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QKY9-PVBJ]. 
 162 Id. 
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Figure 1: Median CEO Pay Ratio for Firms in the Russell 3000  
Index by Market Capitalization* 
 
 
Figure 2: Median CEO Pay Ratio for Firms in the Russell 3000  
Index by Employee Count 
 
The pay ratios also show significant variation when aggregated by in-
dustry (see Figure 3).163 The consumer goods or retail sector, where the work-
force is often part-time and seasonal, has the highest pay ratios, with a median 
pay ratio of 384:1.164 By contrast, in utilities, where employees are more like-
ly to be full-time, the pay ratios are much lower, with a median of 58:1.165 
  
                                                                                                                           
 163 See PEARL MEYER, supra note 160, at 6. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
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Figure 3: Median CEO Pay Ratio by Industry Sector 
 
Although the 2018 data suggests that there are broad trends that have 
emerged based on size and industry, there are many outliers. For example, the 
highest reported ratios were 5,908:1 (Weight Watchers) and 4,987:1 (Mattel), 
but there were companies with a 1:1 ratio (Apollo Global Management, The 
Carlyle Group), and even a ratio of 0 or close to 0 (Twitter, RE/MAX Hold-
ings, Alphabet/Google).166 These outlier ratios were driven by idiosyncratic 
reasons, which we discuss below. 
C. Reliability and Comparability Problems 
Two sets of reasons undermine the reliability and comparability of the 
pay ratio data and call into question the utility of the entire regulatory enter-
prise. Most importantly, companies often operate very differently, even if 
they are the same size or in the same industry. As a result, they may differ in 
the way they compensate their executives, in how they are organized, or in 
the labor markets upon which they draw. The pay ratio regulations do not, 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Tomi Kilgore, CEO Pay Ratio Disclosures Provide Little More Than Noise for Investors, 
MARKETWATCH (May 28, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ceo-pay-ratios-provide-
little-more-than-noise-for-investors-2018-04-20 [https://perma.cc/J8FM-9X8M] (noting the pay 
ratios of Weight Watchers and Mattel); David McCann, Pay Ratio Disclosures Mislead Investors, 
CFO (Mar. 14, 2018), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2018/03/pay-ratio-disclosures-mislead-
investors [https://perma.cc/N3WF-KLQ2] (noting the pay ratios of Apollo and Carlyle); see Phan, 
supra note 159 (noting the pay ratios of Twitter, RE/MAX and Alphabet/Google). 
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and, for the most part, cannot adequately account for these differences. In 
addition, the broad methodological flexibility afforded to companies allows 
them to choose the pay ratio that places them in the best light. Thus, two simi-
larly situated companies can report quite different numbers simply because 
they are permitted to use different inputs or methods of calculating those 
numbers. 
1. Operational Differences 
Rather than providing an indicator of firm quality or governance, differ-
ences in pay ratios are most likely to reflect the basic fact that each firm is 
different. When a firm is well-run, it uses a compensation scheme tailored to 
its individual characteristics. We illustrate how three such differences distort 
the pay ratio data and compromise comparisons among firms. 
a. Low Pay CEOs 
In companies where the CEO is the founder or has otherwise amassed a 
significant amount of stock in the company, the cash salary is viewed as a 
trivial component of the executive’s compensation.167 As a result, they are 
only paid a nominal amount, some down to as little as $1. This obviously has 
a significant distortionary effect on the company’s pay ratio. 
For example, as mentioned previously, Alphabet’s pay ratio in 2018 was 
a scant 0.000005:1, because its CEO, Larry Page, was paid $1 for the year, 
while the median employee received $197,274.168 Similarly, Amazon report-
ed a low pay ratio of 59:1, even though Jeff Bezos, the company’s CEO, is 
one of the wealthiest people in the world.169 That wealth, however, is due to 
his stock holdings—in 2017, he owned 78.9 million shares in Amazon, worth 
approximately $33 billion—and not due to his reported compensation, which 
was a relatively modest $1.68 million.170 
These low pay arrangements do not mean that executives such as Page 
or Bezos are getting little current compensation from the company. Rather, 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See generally Emily Stewart, 11 CEOs That Make Less Money Than You Do, THE STREET 
(June 12, 2015), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13111869/1/10-super-rich-ceos-who-only-make-
one-dollar-in-salary.html [https://perma.cc/QC2G-GTJ6] (“What CEOs aren’t getting in base pay 
they often receive in stock, options, bonuses and perks. In many cases, they’ve already amassed 
fortunes large enough to render any reasonable base pay irrelevant.”). 
 168 Alicia Ritcey & Jenn Zhao, Alphabet CEO Page Makes a Tiny Fraction Compared to Its 
Median Employee, BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/ceo-pay-
ratio [https://perma.cc/67NA-DYX2]. 
 169 Kilgore, supra note 166. 
 170 Id. Moreover, only $81,840 of Bezos’ total annual compensation constituted salary and the 
remainder was the cost of security arrangements for him. Id. 
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the bulk of their compensation comes in the form of investment returns from 
dividends and appreciation, which are not counted for pay ratio purposes. For 
example, Berkshire Hathaway disclosed a pay ratio of 1.9:1, because CEO 
Warren Buffett’s annual compensation was $100,000, the same salary he has 
received for the past 25 years, and the median employee’s pay was 
$53,510.171 In 2017, however, Buffett’s stock in Berkshire Hathaway rose in 
value by approximately $15.1 billion, which, when combined with his salary, 
would result in a pay ratio of 282,435:1.172 This begs the question: Which of 
these two numbers paints an accurate picture of the relationship between 
CEO pay and median worker pay at Berkshire Hathaway? 
b. Choice of Entity 
Some executives receive most of their compensation in the form of in-
vestment return not because of their stockholdings, as in the cases of Page 
and Bezos, but because of the organization of their firm. For example, Apollo 
Global Management, the Carlyle Group, and Dorchester Minerals each re-
ported very low pay ratios. Apollo’s was 1:1 because CEO Leon Black’s 
compensation of $251,888 was almost the same as the $249,750 received by 
the firm’s median employee.173 Carlyle had a similar arrangement, paying 
each of its three “co-principal executive officers” $281,750 while paying 
$201,315 to its median employee, leading to a 1.4:1 pay ratio.174 Dorchester 
had an even lower ratio of 0.9:1, because CEO William McManemin was 
paid $96,000, while the median employee received $106,385.175 
In all three cases, the low CEO salaries were a function of the organiza-
tion of the firms as publicly-traded limited partnerships.176 In such a structure, 
the CEO is also a partner and receives a substantial amount of his or her in-
come in the form of distributions from partnership profits, which are not in-
cluded in the calculation of CEO pay under the pay ratio regulations. Thus, 
for example, even though Leon Black of Apollo received $191.3 million in 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Len Boselovic, You Can Now Compare a CEO’s Pay to an Average Worker’s Wage. But 
How Much Can You Learn from That?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 11, 2018), http://www.
post-gazette.com/business/career-workplace/2018/06/11/fortunate-50-CEO-pay-ratios-average-
worker-wage-pittsburgh-companies/stories/201806100011 [https://perma.cc/TK2K-Z7AS]; Matt 
Levine, Warren Buffett Is Just an Average Employee, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.
bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-03-19/warren-buffett-is-just-an-average-employee [https://perma.
cc/2MWW-PL9H]. 
 172 Levine, supra note 171. As Levine concedes, though, “perhaps the median Berkshire em-
ployee also owns some stock that appreciated last year.” Id. 
 173 McCann, supra note 166. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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his capacity as partner last year, none of it was included in his total compen-
sation for purposes of the pay ratio.177 Similarly, Carlyle excluded the $66.3 
million that went to one of its chief executives and the $62.7 million that 
went to each of the other two.178 
c. Labor Markets 
By its design, the pay ratio combines data from the labor market for ex-
ecutives and the markets for rank-and-file employees. Each of these markets, 
however, is subject to different dynamics, different supply and demand, and 
different levels of pay. The “median worker” by necessity is part of a labor 
market, but that market may not even be the market from which the majority 
of the firm’s labor force is drawn.179 In large firms, many of which are con-
glomerates, the median worker is likely to come from a specialized market 
with its own dynamics. There could be some rationale for comparing the lev-
els of pay in two labor markets through a ratio, but in the case of the pay ra-
tio, the comparison is a random one because the labor market from which the 
“median worker” is drawn is close to random, and certainly not comparable 
among firms. 
Beyond the problems in comparing the labor markets for median em-
ployees, the composition of each firm’s labor force is unique. This leads firms 
that otherwise look similar to report very different pay ratios. Consider, for 
example, Mattel and Hasbro, two public companies in the toy industry. Mat-
tel’s reported pay ratio of 4,987:1 dwarves Hasbro’s ratio of 160:1.180 This 
huge disparity does not indicate that Hasbro is a “better” company or that it is 
“more fair” to its employees. Instead, the disparity is explained by two com-
pletely idiosyncratic factors. 
The first factor has to do with the denominator of the pay ratio: median 
worker pay. Mattel relies heavily on temporary and seasonal employees, and 
78% of its workforce is located outside the United States, both of which help 
explain its low median employee pay of $6,271.181 By contrast, Hasbro, 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. No information was available on McManemin’s share of Dorchester’s profits, but “in 
recent years Dorchester’s per share dividend payouts have far surpassed its per-share earnings.” 
Id. 
 179 See Kay & Martin, supra note 159 (“This larger variation occurs because each company is 
disclosing the pay of a single employee. This one employee’s pay level and the overall pay struc-
ture are impacted by many opaque, firm-specific business model issues . . . . Thus, a company’s 
specific median employee pay cannot be directly compared with that of another company in a 
different industry or even compared with an industry peer that has a different business model.”). 
 180 Kilgore, supra note 166. 
 181 Id. Mattel’s median employee works in a factory in Malaysia. The company disclosed that its 
median wage for its U.S. employees “is more than quadruple the global figure.” Theo Francis, Why 
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whose employees are generally full-time and located in the United States, 
reported median employee pay of $74,207.182 These disparities reflect differ-
ent operating models. Mattel does most of its work in its own factories, em-
ploying 35,820 people in “low-wage regions in Asia, including China.”183 It 
claims “it does so to maintain better control over quality and because manag-
ers have felt it was more efficient than contracting out.”184 Hasbro, which 
only employs 5,400 people, disclosed in its annual report that it outsources 
most of its toy production through “unrelated third party manufacturers in 
various Far East countries, principally China.”185 The outsourced workers 
have no effect on the pay ratio. At both companies, the actual toys are likely 
made by a similar number of workers who make a competitive wage and like-
ly work in similar locations. Despite these similarities, the two companies 
report radically different median worker pay figures because one company 
employs those workers directly and the other does so only indirectly. 
The second factor has to do with the numerator of the pay ratio: CEO 
pay. Mattel’s CEO, Margo Georgiadis, was hired in February of 2017, so her 
total compensation of $31.28 million primarily reflected the stock and stock 
option awards valued at $28.05 million.186 Hasbro’s CEO, Brian Goldner, 
who has held the position since 2008, received total compensation of $11.85 
million, which does not reflect the appreciation in stock he already received 
in prior years.187 Ironically, Georgiadis exited Mattel after only a little more 
than a year on the job.188 The difference in stability at the top in the two com-
panies may also exacerbate the difference in CEO pay.189 
This dynamic is not unique to Mattel and Hasbro. Other direct competi-
tors have also reported very different pay ratio and median worker pay fig-
                                                                                                                           
Mattel and Hasbro Workers Are a World Apart on Pay, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.
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 182 Kilgore, supra note 166. 
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 186 Kilgore, supra note 166. 
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cent Trends, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 192, 193 (2004). 
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ures, not because one company is more generous to its employees than the 
other, but because of the way the companies are structured. For example, Ver-
izon and AT&T are both large, publicly-traded, telecommunication companies 
that appear to be quite similar. Yet, Verizon’s median worker made $127,000, 
whereas AT&T’s only made $78,000.190 It would be inapt to compare these 
figures and draw conclusions about the two companies because they are very 
different operationally. AT&T is based in a lower-cost part of the country than 
Verizon, AT&T focuses more on landline operations that rely on lower paid-
workers, while Verizon is focused in wireless, and AT&T owns more of its 
own retail stores, with the accompanying low-paid sales staff, whereas Veri-
zon outsources more of its lower-paid work.191 
2. Differences in Methodology 
Beyond operational differences, the pay ratio numbers are also distorted 
by the methodological flexibility afforded to companies. As discussed earlier, 
the regulations give companies flexibility in how they identify the median 
employee, whether they exclude certain employees who meet specified crite-
ria, and what compensation to include in the calculations. This flexibility may 
allow companies the ability to provide a more nuanced and sophisticated pic-
ture of themselves. It may, however, also allow them to game the rules to 
come up with a more favorable ratio, which, according to early evidence, is 
the more likely outcome.192 In either case, methodological flexibility comes 
at the cost of accuracy and comparability. The following four examples illus-
trate the problem. 
Statistical Sampling. Under the regulations, a firm can identify its medi-
an employee using statistical sampling rather than surveying its workforce.193 
This method was used by 2.9% of all Russell 3000 companies and 6.8% of all 
Equilar 500 companies.194 Although a small minority in the overall scheme of 
things, it may have had a noticeable effect in the companies that did use it. 
One company that adopted this sampling approach was Fresh Del Monte.195 
It employs 39,089 employees, but it only used a sample size of 217 employ-
ees to identify its median employee, a mere 0.5% of the total employee popu-
                                                                                                                           
 190 Theo Francis, Does Verizon Really Pay the Typical Worker 60% More Than AT&T?, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-verizon-really-pay-the-typical-
worker-60-more-than-at-t-1522238400 [https://perma.cc/4A9R-BQU5]. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See infra notes 362–363 and accompanying text. 
 193 Regulation S-K, Item 402(u), Instruction 4(2), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017). 
 194 Phan, supra note 159. 
 195 McCann, supra note 166. 
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lation.196 It is unlikely that the company chose this approach to make its pay 
ratio look good—at 1,465:1, it was one of the highest ratios reported—but the 
sampling could have contributed to its low reported median employee pay of 
$5,833.197 As one observer noted, “an employee may see the average pay 
listed for their company and think they are being under- or overpaid . . . . In-
stead, the differences may be based on how the calculation was done.”198 
De Minimis Exception. One of the concessions the regulations make to 
the problem of including foreign workers is the de minimis exception. As dis-
cussed in Part II.A, this permits companies to exclude foreign workers if they 
constitute no more than 5% of the company’s workforce. The de minimis ex-
ception has been one of the most frequently used, with approximately 24.5% 
of Russell 3000 companies and 36.7% of all public companies excluding for-
eign workers.199 
Consistently Applied Compensation Methodology (“CACM”). An analy-
sis of pay ratio disclosures as of July 2018 found that the CACM used in de-
termining the median employee’s compensation varied wildly, with 39% us-
ing total cash compensation, 28% using base pay and wages, 14% using the 
amount of wages reported on employee W-2 statements, and 25% using total 
direct compensation.200 This can have a significant impact on the comparabil-
ity of pay ratios. 
Consider again the case of Verizon and AT&T’s divergent median em-
ployee pay numbers. In addition to the operational differences discussed 
above, differences in methodology may have also played a significant role. 
AT&T used cash compensation to calculate median worker pay, even bypass-
ing the first employee it identified because of “an unusual pension benefit.”201 
Verizon, by contrast, included company-paid health care, plus “estimates for 
company contributions to 401(k) and supplemental-retirement plans, as well 
as an estimate of the present value of any annual gains in the employee’s fu-
ture pension benefits.”202 Thus, not only did Verizon’s methodology include 
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inputs that may not have been in AT&T’s calculation, but it required assump-
tions that may have inflated the median employee’s compensation even fur-
ther. 
Alternate Pay Ratios. The regulations permit companies to include pay 
ratios different than the required ratio if they are necessary to reflect some 
unusual pay arrangements, such as a one-time bonus paid to a CEO in con-
nection with a merger.203 One survey found that 13% of companies disclosed 
an alternative ratio, with the most common rationales being the exclusion of 
certain types of compensation, such as one time bonuses, pension values, or 
certain equity in long-term incentive structures, or the exclusion of certain 
categories of employees, such as displaying a domestic employee-only ra-
tio.204 Most companies disclosed lower alternative pay ratios, but several dis-
closed alternative ratios that were actually higher than the required ratio, sug-
gesting that they may have been communicating with their own employees 
(who might otherwise individually think they were underpaid).205 
III. THE PAY RATIO’S MULTIPLE AUDIENCES AND USES 
Despite the reliability and comparability problems discussed in Part II, 
the pay ratio data has attracted the attention of a broad set of audiences: the 
news media, national politicians, state and local governments, labor unions, 
think tanks, corporate decisionmakers and advisers, and firms’ employees and 
customers. In this Part, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the use 
of the pay ratio disclosures by these audiences to date.206 
Four general patterns emerge. First, the number of audiences and the 
amount of attention they have devoted to the pay ratio disclosures are unusual-
ly high compared to other types of corporate disclosure. Second, though the 
stated purpose of the pay ratio was to inform investor decisionmaking, the data 
has been used by non-corporate constituencies to make rhetorical points, exert 
influence on firms, or highlight issues such as pay disparities within firms, or 
economic inequality more broadly. This supports the notion, suggested in Part 
I.D, that certain stakeholders expect the pay ratio to fulfill additional functions, 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Matthew B. Grunert & Emily E. Cabrera, CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure: What We’ve 
Seen in Filings So Far, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure-what-we-ve-seen-filings-so-far [https://perma.cc/8T4L-W49J]. 
 204 DELOITTE CONSULTING, supra note 202, at 12. 
 205 Id. We discuss employee perceptions of pay ratios in Part III.E.1. 
 206 Though timely, our analysis is by definition limited by the fact that pay ratio reporting has 
been in effect only since January 2018. Because of the long run-up to the release of the first set of 
pay ratio figures and in light of existing experience with CEO pay disclosures, many trendlines 
can be identified already. Where the available evidence is more tenuous, we have framed our 
analysis accordingly. 
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such as a behavioral function or a public discourse function. Third, the media 
and various stakeholders referred to a range of different aggregate pay ratio 
numbers, each of which was intended to convey an impression of the econo-
my-wide pay ratio. Finally, the data’s deficiencies have received practically no 
attention and virtually all users have engaged in data comparisons among 
firms despite the SEC’s admonition that the data is not fit for such compari-
sons. These patterns help to set the pay ratio disclosure rule apart from other 
rules within the SEC disclosure regime, a point we explore in Part V, when we 
discuss the pay ratio’s unique disclosure-as-soundbite approach. 
A. Media Coverage 
The first set of pay ratio disclosures released in 2018 generated wide-
spread coverage in national, international, and local media outlets. Even 
though public companies regularly disclose large volumes of information on 
various topics as part of their SEC reporting obligations, no disclosure topic 
apart from corporate earnings was covered by the national media to the same 
extent as the pay ratio disclosures. Between January 1 and June 30, 2018, the 
Wall Street Journal ran 14 articles discussing the pay ratio rule or pay ratio 
data.207 The New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Huffington Post, 
to name a few, also ran prominent articles about the pay ratio.208 The Bloom-
berg website displayed a tracker, updated on an ongoing basis, providing 
comprehensive and user-friendly pay ratio data, which informed articles about 
the pay ratio in other media outlets.209 Local newspapers, despite shrinking 
newsrooms, published original stories focused on pay disparities at local 
                                                                                                                           
 207 Authors’ survey of articles in the Wall Street Journal during the specified period, which 
captures the annual proxy season, along with its run-up and immediate aftermath. Excluded from 
the count were articles that mentioned the pay ratio alongside other executive compensation data 
but did not focus on it. 
 208 See, e.g., Arthur Delaney & Dave Jamieson, Companies Are Disclosing How Much Less 
They Pay Workers Than Executives, HUFFPOST (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/ceo-pay-disclosure_us_5aa6da18e4b03c9edfae9aec [https://perma.cc/YD8F-FCPL]; David 
Gelles, Want to Make Money Like a C.E.O.? Work for 275 Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/highest-paid-ceos-2017.html [https://perma.cc/BN6D-
RTEX]; Jena McGregor, As Companies Reveal Gigantic CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios, Some Worry 
How Low-Paid Workers Might Take the News, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/02/21/as-companies-reveal-gigantic-ceo-to-
worker-pay-ratios-some-worry-how-low-paid-workers-might-take-the-news/ [https://perma.cc/
VG34-PZE6]. 
 209 How Your Pay Stacks Up With the CEO’s, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/ceo-pay-ratio/ [https://perma.cc/FQW4-GNJU]; see, e.g., Emily Stewart, How Does a Com-
pany’s CEO Pay Compare to Its Workers’? Now You Can Find Out., VOX (Apr. 8, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/8/17212796/ceo-pay-ratio-corporate-governance-wealth-
inequality [https://perma.cc/R646-FSG3]. 
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companies.210 Publications with a global readership, such as the Financial 
Times and the Economist, also featured articles on the pay ratio disclosures of 
U.S. public companies.211 Even stories that focused primarily on outsized 
executive compensation included the new pay ratio figures alongside met-
rics such as annual total shareholder return in order to place CEO pay in 
context.212 
What made the pay ratio disclosures so newsworthy? Apart from novel-
ty, it was the accessibility of the information and its capacity to generate 
click-worthy headlines that resonate with readers: “Want to Make Money 
Like a C.E.O.? Work for 275 Years,”213 or, in a local example, “Colorado 
CEOs Earn in Three Days What the Typical Worker Earns in a Year.”214 Web-
sites offered interactive tools inviting employees to compare how their pay 
“stacks up with the CEO’s.”215 Coverage often focused on the high pay ratios 
of household names, such as Wal-Mart, Mattel, and Time-Warner.216 
News stories broke down and analyzed the pay ratio data according to 
various firm attributes, including industry, market capitalization, workforce 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See, e.g., James Dornbrook, Filing Reveals Cost of CEO Change at H&R Block, Extraor-
dinarily High CEO-to-Median Employee Pay Ratio, KANSAS CITY BUS. J. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://
www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2018/08/02/hr-block-executive-compensation.html; Alexia 
Elejalde-Ruiz, The Boss Makes How Much? Illinois Companies Reveal CEO-to-Worker Pay Ra-
tio, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-ceo-pay-ratio-20
180427-story.html; Bruce Murphy, CEOs Paid 1,000 Times More Than Average Workers, URBAN 
MILWAUKEE (May 22, 2018), https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2018/05/22/murphys-law-ceos-paid-
1000-times-more-than-average-workers/ [https://perma.cc/5ZMF-HYLH]; Aldo Svaldi, Colorado 
CEOs Earn in Three Days What the Typical Worker Earns in a Year, New Disclosures Show, 
DENVER POST (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/04/20/colorado-ceo-worker-
pay-gap [https://perma.cc/S9Q3-C3SF]. 
 211 See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins, Bosses’ Pay Disclosures Fuel Staff Dissatisfaction, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ebd90ac0-2ec5-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381; American 
Firms Reveal the Gulf Between Bosses’ and Workers’ Pay, THE ECONOMIST (May 26, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/05/26/american-firms-reveal-the-gulf-between-bosses-
and-workers-pay [https://perma.cc/BC5L-26E6]. 
 212 See, e.g., Brent Lang & David Lieberman, Breaking Down the Salaries of Media’s Most 
Powerful Executives, VARIETY (May 8, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/media-executive-
salaries-leslie-moonves-bob-iger-rupert-murdoch-1202801568 [https://perma.cc/3JMD-KCK5] (re-
porting that the CEO of Discovery Communications received $42.2 million in 2017, while total 
shareholder return was -18.4%, and the pay ratio was 522:1). 
 213 See Gelles, supra note 208. 
 214 See Svaldi, supra note 210. 
 215 See How Your Pay Stacks up with the CEO’s, supra note 209; see also Sarah Nassauer, At 
Walmart, the CEO Makes 1,188 Times as Much as the Median Worker, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-walmart-the-ceo-makes-1-188-times-as-much-as-the-median-
worker-1524261608 [https://perma.cc/4DK4-DT66] (providing a “check your pay” feature).  
 216 See, e.g., David Gelles, Six C.E.O. Pay Packages That Explain Soaring Executive Com-
pensation, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/top-ceo-
pay-packages.html [https://perma.cc/PG4B-LFMH]. 
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size, and region,217 despite the fact that when adopting the rule the SEC ex-
pressly noted that the pay ratio data would be unfit for making such compari-
sons.218 The New York Times even came up with a creative derivative statistic, 
“the Marx ratio,” which used the new median worker pay data as an input to 
capture the relative returns on labor and capital within firms, again for the 
purpose of making comparisons.219 In short, the 2018 pay ratio data presented 
the media with an irresistible source of news stories about high pay disparities 
at well-known companies. 
The new pay ratio data did not merely attract significant media attention, 
but it also shifted the nature of the coverage of corporate compensation is-
sues. Before 2018, firms were required to disclose only the total compensa-
tion received by the five highest-paid executives. As a result, when reporting 
on these annual disclosures the media generally focused on the sheer size of 
executive pay packages—often amounting to tens of millions of dollars, on 
comparisons among CEOs across firms and industries, and on the persistent 
disconnect between executive pay and corporate performance.220 The key 
takeaway of pre-2018 news stories was that U.S. CEOs are overpaid and ex-
ecutive compensation practices are broken.221 
By contrast, the availability of company-specific data in 2018 zeroed the 
media’s attention on pay disparities between rank-and-file workers and man-
agement, and, more broadly, on income inequality. Even standing on its own, 
the pay ratio shows the disparity between CEO pay and median worker pay 
inside a given firm. Many of the news stories and commentary drew an ex-
press link between high pay ratios and societal income inequality.222 Going a 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See American Firms Reveal the Gulf Between Bosses’ and Workers’ Pay, supra note 211; 
see also Vanessa Fuhrmans & Theo Francis, How Does the Boss’s Pay Compare to the Rank and 
File?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-early-look-at-the-ceo-worker-
pay-ratio-1517505343 [https://perma.cc/VWE5-65TF]. 
 218 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 219 Neil Irwin, Is Capital or Labor Winning at Your Favorite Company? Introducing the Marx 
Ratio, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/21/upshot/
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 220 See, e.g., Tim Mullaney, Why Corporate CEO Pay Is So High, and Going Higher, CNBC.
COM (May 18, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/18/why-corporate-ceo-pay-is-so-high-and-
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 221 Stories about executive compensation did occasionally mention the ratio between CEO 
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for the entire U.S. economy and did not contain any information about individual companies. See, 
e.g., Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at 110. 
 222 See, e.g., Gelles supra note 208 (characterizing high pay ratios as “stark illustrations of 
income inequality”); Jon Talton, It’s Suite at the Top, but Runaway CEO Pay Doesn’t Help the 
Economy, SEATTLE TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/its-
suite-at-the-top-but-runaway-ceo-pay-is-bad-for-capitalism [https://perma.cc/5LQH-98YQ] (sug-
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step further, the Financial Times warned that “failing to narrow the pay gap 
within companies will imperil capitalism,” and the use of a “Marx ratio” by 
the New York Times seemed designed to make a similar point.223  
B. Policymakers 
When the pay ratio concept entered the public eye in 2010, politicians 
immediately linked it to concerns over income inequality.224 The release of 
the first set of pay ratio figures in 2018 accelerated these trends. What is 
more, none of them occur in a vacuum: The political attention simultaneously 
contributes to and feeds off of the media coverage of the pay ratio. This atten-
tion is also intertwined with the work of labor unions and other advocacy 
groups, which we discuss in Part III.C. These players have all used the pay 
ratio as a means of fomenting or amplifying public discourse about income 
inequality. 
1. National Politicians 
The 2018 pay ratio data quickly proved useful to progressive politicians 
in motivating new policy proposals. In August 2018, Senator Elizabeth War-
ren introduced the Accountable Capitalism Act, a bill that contains a number 
of wide-ranging policy proposals, which, if implemented, will remake the 
basic infrastructure of U.S. corporate law.225 Upon the release of the ambi-
tious bill, Senator Warren published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal not-
ing that the driving force behind the legislation was income inequality and 
relying on pay ratio data to illustrate the increase in income inequality over 
time.226 The aggregate pay ratio figure used by Senator Warren was 361:1, 
which came from the AFL-CIO.227 
                                                                                                                           
gesting that the patterns of CEO and worker pay are symptomatic of serious economy-wide prob-
lems). 
 223 See Irwin, supra note 219; Jenkins, supra note 211. 
 224 See supra Part I.B. 
 225 See Press Release, Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable 
Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-
introduces-accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/GRP8-X4YM]. As an example of its 
scope, the bill would require large corporations to obtain a federal charter, require boards to con-
sider the interests of all stakeholders when making decisions, and enable employees to elect at 
least 40% of the board of directors. Id. 
 226 See Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-
only-to-shareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/LZ8R-FY6S] (“The average CEO of a big com-
pany now makes 361 times what the average worker makes, up from 42 times in 1980.”). 
 227 See infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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Driven by similar concerns, in September 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders 
and Representative Ro Khanna introduced a bill proposing a tax on large cor-
porations equal to the federal benefits received by their low-wage employ-
ees.228 The bill’s title, Stop Bad Employers by Zeroing Out Subsidies (BE-
ZOS) Act, made direct reference to Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos. In public 
statements surrounding the bill’s release, Senator Sanders singled out Ama-
zon’s poor workplace conditions and worker treatment. The same statements 
referenced the median worker pay figure from Amazon’s pay ratio disclosure, 
$28,446. Senator Sanders then combined this figure with the appreciation of 
the CEO’s Amazon stock holdings (and not with his SEC-reported annual 
salary) to note that in ten seconds, Amazon’s CEO made as much as Ama-
zon’s median worker did in all of 2017.229 
Another prominent example of the political use of the new pay ratio data 
is a report by Representative Keith Ellison, entitled Rewarding or Hoarding: 
An Examination of Pay Ratios Revealed by Dodd-Frank, and published in 
May 2018.230 The report starts by providing an accessible overview of the pay 
ratio’s history and calculation methodology, and discusses the magnitude of 
the reported pay ratios in a somewhat populist manner.231 Using well-known 
companies as examples, the report highlights statistics such as the number of 
median employees a company can hire with the CEO’s salary, and the number 
of years a median worker would need to work to earn the CEO’s annual sala-
ry.232 The report links such pay inequity to income inequality, which is its 
central theme. Overall, the report was quite successful in generating addition-
al coverage of the pay ratio data.233 The report included an aggregate pay ra-
                                                                                                                           
 228 See Press Release, Office of Senator Bernie Sanders, Sanders, Khanna Introduce Bill to Get 
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tio of 339:1, representing the average of the pay ratios of 225 Fortune 500 
companies that had already disclosed their ratios at the time the report was 
compiled.234 
2. State and Local Governments 
Whereas national politicians have been using the pay ratio data to high-
light income inequality and shame individual companies, policymakers at the 
state and local level are going one step further by seeking to actually penalize 
firms with high pay ratios. The most prominent example is a Portland, Ore-
gon city ordinance adopted in December 2016, which increased the local 
business license tax liability of companies with high pay ratios.235 Companies 
with a pay ratio of at least 100 and not more than 249 are subject to a 10% 
extra tax (or surtax), and companies with a pay ratio equal to or above 250 are 
required to pay a 25% surtax.236 The ordinance relies on the SEC disclosures 
of firms doing business in Portland and is expected to affect around 500 of 
them. The revenue from the surtax is projected at approximately $3 million in 
the first year and has been earmarked for funding affordable housing and po-
lice and fire services.237 It appears that the primary impetus behind the Port-
land ordinance was addressing income inequality, as evidenced by the state-
ments of its principal author238 and the discussion of studies of income ine-
quality contained in the bill’s text.239 
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When the Portland ordinance passed, one report noted that it may mark 
“the dawn of a new ‘pay ratio politics.’”240 This has proved prescient: Since 
2016, Portland-style surtax measures have been put forward in California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Is-
land, Washington, San Francisco, and even at the federal level.241 In a similar 
vein, proposed legislation in Connecticut would disqualify companies with 
high ratios from receiving state subsidies and grants, and proposed legislation 
in Rhode Island would give preferential treatment in state contracting to firms 
where the CEO is paid no more than 25 times the median worker.242 
Some of these pay ratio proposals have expired or have been put on 
hold, and it remains to be seen whether any would be successful.243 Similar 
measures have been mooted before, only to be abandoned.244 Two things, 
however, are different this time around: firm-specific pay ratio data is now 
required to be calculated and reported on an annual basis, and the substantial 
publicity from these disclosures may increase the perceived legitimacy of pay 
ratios as a policy lever. 
C. Advocacy Groups 
Another set of public actors who have focused on the pay ratio can be 
placed under the loose banner of advocacy groups. These include labor un-
ions and think tanks working on income inequality and labor-related issues. 
The reactions of these advocacy groups show a range of approaches. 
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1. Labor Unions 
As we saw in Part I, the support of labor unions was crucial to the sur-
vival and implementation of the pay ratio rule. One of these organizations, the 
AFL-CIO, has produced an annual “Executive Pay Watch” since the 1990s.245 
That report has traditionally focused on the companies with the highest-paid 
CEOs, providing critical commentary about their executive compensation 
practices.246 In prior years, the report also presented general pay ratio data 
based on Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates. The 2018 pay ratio data ena-
bled an enhancement of this approach: the Pay Watch reported and ranked the 
pay ratios of individual companies.247 As in prior years, the AFL-CIO’s 2018 
Executive Pay Watch attracted media attention, which linked executive pay 
practices to income inequality.248 The AFL-CIO reported an aggregate pay 
ratio of 361:1, describing this as the pay of the average CEO of an S&P 500 
company divided by the pay of the average production and nonsupervisory 
worker in an S&P 500 company.249 
2. Think Tanks 
The Institute for Policy Studies (“IPS”) has published an annual report 
in an “Executive Excess” series since 1994. Over the years, the reports have 
linked executive compensation to problems such as pay inequity, bailouts, 
outsourcing, and corporate fraud.250 The 2018 IPS report was dedicated solely 
to the new pay ratio data and was entitled How Taxpayers Subsidize Giant 
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Corporate Pay Gaps.251 The report focused on the pay ratios of the 50 largest 
federal contractors and the 50 companies that receive the most in government 
subsidies. It used the pay ratio data to generate memorable statistics, such as 
the number of top 50 contractors with a CEO-to-median worker ratio higher 
than 100:1 (68%), the value of federal contracts awarded to those firms in 
2017 ($167 billion), and the average CEO pay at those firms ($18 million).252 
The report also used the pay ratio data to draw attention to the pay practices 
of a number of well-known companies. 
In addition to highlighting the new data, the IPS report made concrete 
recommendations that deploy the pay ratio to “ensure that taxpayers are not 
subsidizing extreme CEO-worker pay gaps . . . through tax, contracting, or 
subsidy policies,” and to “leverage the power of the public purse to narrow 
[such] dangerous divides.”253 These policy recommendations include using 
the pay ratio data to treat firms differentially in terms of business taxation, 
public procurement, and corporate subsidies and bailouts—punishing firms 
where the ratios are “too high” and rewarding firms where the ratios are with-
in a desired norm.254 These recommendations echo the Portland tax bill and 
other proposed bills at the state and local level, which we discussed in Part 
III.B.2. 
Another think tank, the Economic Policy Institute (“EPI”), took a differ-
ent approach to the pay ratio data. EPI had focused on pay disparities and 
stagnant wages long before the advent of the SEC-mandated pay ratio disclo-
sures, and it had also devised its own detailed methodology for estimating 
pay ratios.255 EPI’s 2018 report on executive compensation noted the availa-
bility of new pay ratio data disclosed pursuant to firms’ SEC reporting obliga-
tions. Instead of embracing the new data, however, EPI discussed its method-
ological shortcomings, noting that “fierce business resistance” had “watered 
down” its usefulness.256 As a result, the EPI annual report continued to use 
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ing Paper No. 298, 2013), https://www.epi.org/files/2013/wp298-ceo-to-worker-pay-methodology.
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 256 See LAWRENCE MISHEL & JESSICA SCHIEDER, ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO COMPENSATION 
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the EPI’s own pay ratio estimates, which it argued were more accurate.257 The 
aggregate pay ratio reported by EPI was 312:1.258 The EPI report did not give 
up on the pay ratio disclosure rule altogether: It expressed hope that the SEC 
could improve its methodology over time, and included as a potential policy 
proposal the idea of taxing firms with high pay ratios at higher rates.259 
D. Corporate Decisionmakers and Advisors 
Despite the extensive public and media attention, it is worth recalling 
that according to the SEC the pay ratio’s intended audience consists of inves-
tors and not the general public.260 In theory, investors serve as a check on the 
executive compensation decisions made by corporate boards. In exercising 
their respective functions, investors are aided by proxy advisory firms, 
whereas boards receive help from executive compensation advisors. All four 
groups have had a hard time working with the pay ratio rule. The evidence 
thus far suggests that boards and investors are not ignoring the pay ratio, 
though it is unclear precisely how it figures into their decisionmaking. 
1. Executive Compensation Advisors 
Executive compensation advisors focus on helping boards and boards’ 
compensation committees benchmark executive pay, structure executive 
compensation to align pay with performance, and ensure compliance with 
relevant SEC disclosure requirements. Quite naturally, the pay ratio disclo-
sure mandate was a hot topic for compensation advisors ever since its adop-
tion in 2010. In the run-up to the first set of disclosures in 2018, executive 
compensation advisors performed a significant amount of useful work educat-
ing firms about the rule, providing updates at the various stages of the rule’s 
implementation, and exploring compliance strategies and data calculation 
methodologies.261 
After firms started releasing their pay ratio disclosures in the spring of 
2018, the attention of executive compensation advisors turned to analyzing 
                                                                                                                           
 257 The Economic Policy Institute explained that its methodology removed distortions in the 
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 260 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 261 See, e.g., Deb Lifshey, CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Requirement Now Imminent: SEC Releas-
es Additional Guidance, PEARL MEYER (Sept. 2017), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/knowledge-
share/client-alert/ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure-requirement-now-imminent-sec-releases-additional-
guidance [https://perma.cc/H2DP-34MX]. 
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the new data in great detail. The resulting reports broke down median worker 
pay and the pay ratio by firm size, industry, revenue, and number of employ-
ees, among other attributes.262 At least one report performed statistical analy-
sis of the data in an effort to answer fairly complex questions such as how 
much of the variation in pay ratios is associated with CEO or median worker 
pay, and what variables affect the pay ratio, both across the full sample of 
companies and at companies at the top and bottom deciles of the pay ratio 
distribution.263 Most of the reports acknowledged the methodological and 
comparability problems, but analyzed and compared the data nonetheless.264 
The findings of the reports were covered in specialized and general publica-
tions.265 Ultimately, the analytical work done by compensation advisors 
helped publicize the flawed data.266 
2. Boards of Directors 
As a general matter, the pay ratio rule represents a unique and vexing 
challenge for corporate boards. On the one hand, setting and approving exec-
utive compensation—including CEO pay—is among the most important re-
sponsibilities they have.267 On the other hand, however, boards have no direct 
control over the second component of the pay ratio, median worker pay. Ac-
cordingly, even if boards follow best practices in setting CEO pay, the pay 
ratio may still be an outlier due to the median worker pay figure, and thus 
draw negative attention to the board’s executive compensation policies or to 
the firm more generally. 
Although board deliberations are private, two observations offer some 
clues about boards’ use of the data. On the one hand, the executive compensa-
tion advisors who work directly with boards devoted significant attention to 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See, e.g., PEARL MEYER, supra note 160; Phan, supra note 159. 
 263 See Kay & Martin, supra note 159. 
 264 One could argue that executive compensation consultants prepared comparative reports at 
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 267 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the 
Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 695 (2005). 
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the pay ratio disclosures, suggesting that there was at least some demand 
from boards for this kind of information.268 On the other hand, it appears that 
boards did not formally consider the pay ratio when making decisions about 
CEO pay: Under SEC rules, companies are required to disclose “material fac-
tors underlying compensation policies and decisions” in the Compensation 
Discussion & Analysis (“CD&A”) report contained in the proxy statement.269 
Consequently, if the compensation committee of the board of directors con-
sidered the pay ratio in determining CEO pay, the pay ratio would need to be 
mentioned in the CD&A section. According to a survey of corporate filings, 
however, only five percent of companies discussed the pay ratio in the CD&A 
section of their proxy statements in 2018.270 If the goal of the pay ratio rule 
was to induce boards to cut headline CEO pay (the part of the ratio they can 
control), it appears that they have not yet taken up the mantle. 
3. Proxy Advisory Firms 
Even more than executive compensation consultants, the proxy advisory 
firms, primarily ISS and Glass Lewis, play an important role in corporate 
governance. They issue formal recommendations, which directly influence 
investor voting decisions on matters such as the election of directors, various 
shareholder proposals, and the approval of firms’ compensation policies. The 
proxy advisory firms also issue voting guidelines setting forth their general 
policies with respect to important corporate matters. Finally (and somewhat 
controversially), they also provide advisory services to individual firms, in-
cluding on compensation policies.271 
The proxy advisory firms remained mostly silent during the lengthy de-
bates over the pay ratio between 2010 and 2017, but this posture became un-
tenable in the run-up to the 2018 proxy season. Ultimately, the proxy advisory 
firms chose to adopt a wait-and-see approach: not ignoring the new disclo-
sures or dismissing their potential relevance, but also not embracing them. 
Both ISS and Glass Lewis announced that they will reproduce firms’ pay rati-
os and median worker pay figures in their research reports and proxy papers, 
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 269 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 
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thereby giving investors ready access to the information.272 At the same time, 
however, both proxy advisors refused to link the pay ratio disclosures to their 
voting recommendations for the 2018 proxy season. ISS declared that the pay 
ratio “would not impact vote recommendations,” whereas Glass Lewis stated 
that the pay ratio would not be “a determinative factor.”273 Leaving some 
room for maneuver, Glass Lewis noted that the pay ratio may provide “addi-
tional insight” into a company’s pay practices, and ISS undertook to continue 
to assess CEO pay data and seek investor input on its usefulness.274 
Additional publications released by ISS illustrate the difficulty of using 
the pay ratio data in the absence of context. In its 2018 Benchmark Policy 
Recommendations, ISS recommended that investors vote case-by-case on 
proposals “calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate ex-
ecutives and other non-executive employees.”275 ISS also recommended that 
investors reject proposals “calling for the company to use the pay disparity 
analysis or pay ratio in a specific way to set or limit executive pay.”276 In its 
separate capacity as an advisor to companies, ISS encouraged them to “help 
shareholders by putting [the] pay ratio disclosure in context,” and offered a 
set of detailed questions to help guide such contextual disclosures.277 As we 
saw in Part II, however, firms did not heed this advice. 
4. Investors 
Though important, assessing whether and how investors are using the 
pay ratio disclosures is also difficult: Investors are a widely heterogeneous 
group, with different investor types making decisions according to different 
sets of preferences. To complicate matters further, investors routinely make a 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES., U.S. COMPENSATION POLICIES: FREQUENT-
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number of decisions across different companies and rarely report the rea-
sons.278 Sometimes, investors make no decisions at all, either choosing not to 
vote or automatically relying on the recommendations of proxy advisory 
firms.279 With the foregoing caveats in mind, our findings suggest that inves-
tors have not ignored the newly-released pay ratio data, though it is unclear 
whether they are factoring it into their decisionmaking in any meaningful 
way. 
A large-scale survey of institutional investors by ISS in 2017, prior to 
the release of the pay ratio data, found that 63% of respondents planned to 
both compare pay ratios across firms or industry sectors and assess year-on-
year changes in individual firms’ ratios. A further 9% planned to use one of 
these tools of analysis. Only 16% reported that their organization did not plan 
to use the pay ratio information.280 Separately, three of the largest institutional 
investors have indicated that the pay ratio would not be a significant factor in 
their compensation analysis for proxy voting purposes.281 The disclosure of 
an outlier ratio without sufficient context, however, could be a trigger for en-
gagement, according to one of these investors.282 
During the 2018 proxy season, several of the companies that received 
negative publicity due to high pay ratios also lost their say-on-pay votes, a 
rare vote of no confidence from investors.283 It seems likely, however, that 
this was primarily due to the amount and structure of CEO compensation, 
rather than the pay ratio.284 We have no data on whether investors made buy-
ing or selling decisions based on the pay ratio. Such decisions are even more 
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difficult to observe and interpret than voting decisions. We note that prior to 
the rule’s adoption, pro-social (or socially-responsible) investors indicated 
that they do consider labor relations issues in making investment choices.285 
Judging by the overall tenor of the 2018 proxy season, however, it appears 
that “pay for performance” remains the principal driver of investor voting 
decisions.286 
E. Corporate Stakeholders 
The compensation practices of individual firms are of relevance to two 
additional groups in the corporate nexus: employees and customers. Conven-
tionally referred to as corporate stakeholders, they do not have formal deci-
sionmaking power akin to that of management, boards, and shareholders. 
Firms are nonetheless highly dependent on them, either because they provide 
a key input in the form of labor (employees), or because they pay for firms’ 
outputs (customers). There is evidence to suggest that both employees and 
customers are interested in and influenced by the new pay ratio data, and this 
serves to amplify further the overall impact of the pay ratio disclosure rule. 
1. Employees 
Corporate pay structures are notoriously opaque and, consequently, most 
workers do not know how their pay compares to that of others within their 
firm or industry.287 The exception prior to 2018 was the compensation of the 
five highest-paid executives at public companies, but this did not provide a 
relevant source of comparison for rank-and-file employees. The mandated 
disclosure of median worker pay as part of the pay ratio rule changed that: 
For the first time, employees were provided with a more relevant number 
against which to benchmark their own pay. Although pay comparisons are 
particular to each individual, the basic logic within the context of the pay ra-
tio is intuitive. Higher-than-expected median worker salary relative to one’s 
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own salary, or a higher-than-expected median worker salary at peer firms can 
lead to employee dissatisfaction.288 It is known that relative pay, and not just 
pay in absolute terms, motivates workers and affects worker morale.289 This 
effect can be expected to be particularly pronounced in labor markets where 
talent is scarce and geographically-concentrated, such as Silicon Valley, 
which raises both the permeability of relative pay information and its rele-
vance. 
In acknowledgment of the potential risks surrounding the release of the 
pay ratio data, in the run-up to the 2018 proxy season a number of corporate 
advisors suggested that employers should preemptively engage their workers 
to communicate the information and provide context.290 Suggested topics for 
discussion included the company’s compensation philosophy, calculation 
methodology, and unique company characteristics that might result in a 
skewed pay ratio or median worker pay number compared to peers.291 Based 
on this outreach and the overall media attention, we can assume that employ-
ees became aware of the median worker pay figure and that the data, however 
flawed, likely affected their perspective on their employer. 
2. Customers 
Apart from employee morale, there is evidence that firms’ pay ratio dis-
closures also influence the purchase decisions of consumers by informing 
perceptions of wage fairness. Drawing on experimental studies involving 
U.S. consumers, researchers at Harvard Business School found that the dis-
closure of a retailer’s high pay ratio reduces purchase intentions relative to 
firms with lower ratios; that lower pay ratios improve consumer perceptions 
of firm competence; and that a high-ratio firm must offer a significant price 
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discount to be viewed by consumers as favorably as a low-ratio firm charging 
full price.292 These results are corroborated by an analysis of consumer be-
havior following the failed 2009 Swiss referendum that sought to cap pay 
ratios.293 The extensive media coverage of the referendum publicized firms’ 
pay ratios, and, on average, firms’ sales decreased when their pay ratios in-
creased and were in the news.294 Based on these studies, it should be expected 
that the 2018 pay ratio data affected U.S. consumers’ perception of individual 
firms to some extent, to the detriment of firms with high pay ratios. 
IV. THE PAY RATIO’S INFORMATIONAL INTEGRITY IN CONTEXT 
Thus far, we have identified the origins of the pay ratio disclosure rule 
(Part I), the methodological and comparability problems associated with the 
pay ratio data (Part II), and the data’s use by multiple audiences, many of 
which are not ordinarily interested in securities disclosure (Part III). We now 
consider how the quality of the information released pursuant to the pay ratio 
disclosure rule compares to the quality of the information released pursuant to 
the other rules that comprise the securities disclosure regime. To do so, we 
construct the notion of informational integrity: the relative extent to which the 
pay ratio information conforms to three baseline characteristics of securities 
disclosure—accuracy, comprehensibility, and completeness. Even though not 
every existing disclosure rule is perfect on these counts, we find that the qual-
ity of the pay ratio information—the pay ratio’s informational integrity—is so 
low as to be an outlier within the context of the securities disclosure regime. 
A. Overview 
Securities disclosure rules share certain basic desirable characteristics. 
Though these characteristics are not enumerated in a statute, they derive from 
the purpose of the securities disclosure regime, which is to provide investors 
and markets with information that can ensure the accurate valuation of firms’ 
securities and inform investors’ buy/sell and voting decisions.295 According to 
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the SEC, public companies are required to provide “meaningful financial and 
other information to the public,” and this information should be “timely, 
comprehensive, and accurate.”296 One commentator has summarized the gen-
eral expectations for securities disclosure as “accurate, complete, comprehen-
sible, and accessible.”297 Because much of securities disclosure is based on 
financial accounting information, the standards for such information promul-
gated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provide another 
useful reference point. FASB has identified “relevance and faithful represen-
tation” as the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of financial account-
ing information, and “comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and under-
standability” as enhancing qualitative characteristics.298 
These characteristics are somewhat overlapping, ideal types; each of 
them should be viewed not as a binary variable but as part of a continuum. 
Our question here is about the relative position of the pay ratio information 
along these continuums, or, in other words, about the pay ratio’s overall in-
formational integrity relative to other disclosure rules. To lend structure to the 
analysis, we have grouped the baseline characteristics of disclosure into three 
categories: (1) accuracy; (2) comprehensibility; and (3) completeness. In each 
category, we compare the performance of the pay ratio disclosure rule against 
the performance of existing disclosure rules. It bears noting that informational 
integrity as a concept is distinct from the concept of materiality.299 
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more objective inquiry, and not at its significance to investors, though it certainly can and should 
inform policy debates about the pay ratio’s significance and utility. 
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We acknowledge that existing disclosure rules, and, relatedly, financial 
accounting rules suffer from various problems. For example, scholars of ac-
counting have questioned whether certain aspects of the current accounting 
system produce information that is accurate, comprehensible, and complete, 
and even whether it is possible to design a system that can produce such in-
formation.300 These are important debates, but they lie outside the scope of 
our Article. For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this Part, we believe 
that, even if we were to take a fairly skeptical view of the efficacy of the ex-
isting disclosure regime, the pay ratio information is still uniquely deficient 
by comparison. 
B. Accuracy 
The need for accuracy in securities disclosure is intuitive: If investors 
are making decisions based on firm-disclosed information, then the integrity 
of these decisions depends on the integrity of the underlying information. 
Similarly, if disclosure is to promote the accuracy of security prices, then ac-
curate prices depend on accurate information. On a basic level, the accuracy 
of the information in corporate filings is supported by a robust liability re-
gime, which provides investors with remedies when they suffer losses related 
to false or misleading disclosures.301 
Ensuring the accuracy of securities disclosure goes much further than 
deterring fraud. The process of accurately translating a complex objective 
reality into digestible securities disclosure involves many processes and par-
ticipants.302 For example, the historical information pertaining to a company’s 
financial condition and results of operations in the financial statements goes 
through a number of checks to ensure its accuracy: The information is pre-
pared in compliance with a large body of “generally accepted accounting 
principles” (“GAAP”), it is audited by an accounting firm prior to disclosure, 
and it is also subject to certification by the company’s CEO and CFO.303 As 
an additional effort to ensure accuracy, financial information is also verifiable 
because the accounting rules are designed to provide detailed guidance that 
                                                                                                                           
 300 See generally BARUCH LEV & FENG GU, THE END OF ACCOUNTING AND THE PATH FOR-
WARD FOR INVESTORS AND MANAGERS (2016). 
 301 See generally 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION, §§ 7.0–7.17, 12.1–13.2 (6th ed. 2009). 
 302 Professor Henry Hu describes this process as follows: “[a]n intermediary—for instance, a 
corporation issuing shares—stands between the investor and an objective reality. The intermediary 
observes the reality, crafts a depiction of reality, and transmits that depiction to investors.” Hu, 
supra note 297, at 1608. The intermediary is aided in this process by securities regulators, and 
lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and other gatekeepers. See id. 
 303 See How to Read a 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 1, 2012), https://www.sec.
gov/fast-answers/answersreada10khtm.html [https://perma.cc/NCD4-BWR4]. 
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would enable a different set of preparers to replicate the information. Indeed, 
the very purpose of the audit process is to verify the financial statements be-
fore they are disclosed to investors.304 For both financial and non-financial 
information, the SEC uses the broad set of tools at its disposal to provide de-
tailed guidance to firms and their advisors about what should be disclosed, 
and how it should be disclosed.305 
The pay ratio rule does not fit this mold. Investors can be certain of the 
accuracy of the mathematical calculation of the actual ratio (dividing CEO 
pay by median worker pay), but not much else. For something to be capable 
of accurate numerical representation, it ought to be defined with specificity. 
As discussed in Part II, both CEO pay and median worker pay are imprecise 
concepts, which are calculated in ways that afford companies a considerable 
degree of methodological flexibility. As a result, the level of accuracy of the 
underlying figures, and the pay ratio itself, is unknowable. The methodologi-
cal flexibility also renders these figures unverifiable. For example, without 
knowledge of the judgment calls made by the company, a different set of pre-
parers could easily come up with a different median worker, and a different 
median worker pay figure.306  
Interestingly, the pay ratio’s framing also muddles the underlying reality 
the pay ratio is supposed to represent, making it even less capable of “accu-
rate” description. Presumably, the pay ratio is supposed to reflect internal pay 
equity within an organization—how “pay at the top” relates to the pay of 
rank-and-file workers. Even if we assume that pay equity can be expressed 
with any degree of fidelity through a simple ratio, the CEO-to-median worker 
pay ratio may not be the appropriate ratio. The “annual total compensation 
paid to the CEO” is not necessarily an accurate proxy for pay at the top, since 
CEOs sometimes make much more than other top executives, and sometimes 
they make much less than other top executives when judged on this metric 
(as, for example, do the CEOs of Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and Alpha-
                                                                                                                           
 304 When the accounting rules are not clear and judgment calls need to be made, the judgment 
calls themselves are subject to disclosure under a “critical accounting policies” caption. See Cau-
tionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release 
No. 8040, Exchange Act Release No. 45,149, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,013 (Dec. 17, 2001). 
 305 The SEC’s expansive toolkit includes: providing detailed instructions as part of disclosure 
rules; publishing so-called “interpretive releases,” “staff legal bulletins,” “compliance and disclo-
sure interpretations,” “dear CFO letters,” as well as a “financial reporting manual;” periodically 
reviewing and commenting on firms’ disclosure documents; responding to no-action letters from 
firms; providing informal guidance; and, in cases of clear rule violations, pursuing enforcement 
proceedings. See Staff Interpretations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.
sec.gov/interps.shtml [https://perma.cc/V542-VSSY]. 
 306 Recall that, subject to narrow exceptions, companies are not required to detail the method-
ological choices they make as long as those are consistent with the SEC’s permissive guidance. 
See supra notes 137–205 and accompanying text. 
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bet/Google, whose low annual pay we discussed in Part II.C). Similarly, me-
dian worker pay may not be an accurate proxy for the pay of rank-and-file or 
typical workers because, again as discussed in Part II.C, large modern corpo-
rations do not have one worker that is typical of the entire employee popula-
tion.  
The low standard set by the SEC for liability in connection with false or 
misleading pay ratio disclosures serves as further evidence of the problem of 
determining what an accurate pay ratio looks like. In its 2017 Pay Ratio 
Guidance Release, the SEC advised that “if a [company] uses reasonable es-
timates, assumptions or methodologies, the pay ratio and related disclosure 
that results from such use would not provide the basis for Commission en-
forcement action unless the disclosure was made or reaffirmed without a rea-
sonable basis or was provided other than in good faith.”307 
C. Comprehensibility 
Traditional corporate disclosure rules produce information that is meant 
to be comprehensible and useful to investors. For example, the “description 
of business” rubric in corporate filings helps investors understand the compa-
ny’s business, assess how it has changed over time, and compare it to other 
companies.308 The “risk factors” rubric provides information about the risks 
facing the company, which can be compared over time, and against other 
companies’ risk profiles.309 The “executive compensation” rubric allows in-
vestors to compare CEO pay with prior periods and with other companies and 
gain an understanding of the company’s compensation philosophy for top 
management.310 To facilitate comparisons among firms, the SEC seeks to 
standardize the ways in which different firms present the same information.311 
In addition, the SEC regularly fine-tunes its rules based on investor input,312 
and it directs companies to explain the significance of information and pro-
                                                                                                                           
 307 Pay Ratio Guidance Release, supra note 115, at 44,917. 
 308 Regulation S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2018). 
 309 Id. at Item 503. 
 310 Id. at Item 402. 
 311 Indeed, standardization for the purposes of comparability is one of the justifications for the 
existence of a mandatory disclosure regime, as opposed to a regime based on voluntary reporting. 
See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 
AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2018) (illustrating the importance of standardization in the context of nonfi-
nancial risk disclosure). 
 312 For example, the SEC has issued a series of detailed releases and other guidance over the 
years on the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of disclosure reports. See Commis-
sion Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 
Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (providing supplemental guidance on key topics and summariz-
ing prior guidance). 
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vide context where necessary.313 All of these are essential features of the se-
curities disclosure regime aimed at ensuring the comprehensibility and use-
fulness of the disclosed information. 
Because of investors’ heterogeneity, not all of them consume securities 
disclosure in the same way. Certain investor types may be unable to compre-
hend some of the information, and others may choose to ignore disclosure 
altogether. Even then, however, securities disclosure serves a purpose. So-
called information intermediaries, such as research analysts, rating agencies, 
and proxy advisory firms, analyze and translate the information, making it 
more accessible to both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.314 More-
over, so-called information traders act on firms’ disclosures by buying and 
selling securities, which causes the information to get incorporated and re-
flected in firms’ securities prices; this, in turn, ensures that securities prices 
are more accurate—a benefit to all investors.315 These mechanisms do not 
always work perfectly, but they do highlight the central role of securities dis-
closure in financial markets. 
For investors, information intermediaries, and information traders to 
comprehend a piece of corporate disclosure, however, they first need to know 
how to interpret it. Unfortunately, the pay ratio rule presents an intractable 
interpretation challenge. Interpretation requires a way to place the infor-
mation in context and assess it either against an objective benchmark or in 
comparison to the information provided by other firms. Neither approach is 
viable in the case of pay ratio information. There is no objective benchmark, 
because there is no agreement over what constitutes a “good” pay ratio, or a 
“good” median worker salary. The pay ratios that were reported during the 
2018 proxy season were much higher than the public’s notion of what is an 
appropriate pay ratio, so in that sense all firms’ pay ratios are “bad.”316 This 
inference, however, is not particularly helpful to market participants seeking 
to analyze firms and distinguish among different investment options. 
                                                                                                                           
 313 See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2018) (requiring firms to 
disclose “[i]n addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement or re-
port, . . . such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required 
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading”). 
 314 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, 
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). 
 315 See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchimovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (exploring the links between securities disclosure and mar-
ket efficiency). 
 316 See DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., AMERICANS AND CEO PAY: 2016 PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
SURVEY ON CEO COMPENSATION 4 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/cgri-survey-2016-americans-ceo-pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y45L-CUEX]; Kiatpongsan & Nor-
ton, supra note 41, at 592; infra note 346 and accompanying text. 
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For any individual firm’s pay ratio to attain meaning, therefore, it must 
be compared against the pay ratios of other firms. Put simply, even if all rati-
os are “bad,” some must be “less bad” than others. But, as we have had occa-
sion to note more than once already, the SEC has expressly stated that such 
cross-firm comparisons are meaningless due to the design of the rule.317 This 
presents a Catch-22 situation: The information of any given firm has utility 
for investors only when it is compared with the information released by other 
firms, and yet the pay ratio information cannot be compared across firms. As 
we saw in Part III, each of the constituencies that engaged with the 2018 pay 
ratio data relied on comparisons to draw inferences, which makes those infer-
ences suspect. 
There is a limited scenario where the pay ratio data may have utility 
without the need to compare it to other firms. In theory, observing a firm’s 
compensation trends over time could show whether increases in median 
worker pay are keeping up with increases in CEO pay. The problem is that 
CEO pay is determined according to complicated formulas that rely on exter-
nal inputs, such as stock price, which fluctuate over time.318 Such external 
inputs are not normally part of determining median worker pay. As a result, 
CEO pay varies more from year to year than median worker pay. Year-on-
year comparisons of median worker pay may be somewhat more helpful than 
pay ratio comparisons, but their information value would still be limited be-
cause by definition they show only one worker—the median worker. Assum-
ing the structure of a firm’s workforce remains constant, trends in average 
worker pay, which would cover the entirety of a firm’s labor force, would be 
more useful, but the pay ratio rule does not call for the disclosure of this in-
formation. 
Contrast the utility of the pay ratio information with a disclosure re-
quirement from the United Kingdom, which exhibits some superficial simi-
larities. The U.K.’s new gender pay gap disclosure rule requires all firms with 
more than 250 employees to report the difference between what they pay their 
male and female employees.319 Like the pay ratio, the gender pay gap rule 
also results in pithy information on a topic of public importance. Nonetheless, 
it does not pose the same interpretation difficulties because there is a clear 
normative guideline embedded in the gender pay gap rule: equal pay for 
                                                                                                                           
 317 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 318 See, e.g., Elizabeth Peterson, How Is CEO Compensation Determined? It’s Complicated, 
BUS. NEWS DAILY (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/6275-ceo-compensation-
formula.html [https://perma.cc/L6M6-8249]. 
 319 Aleksandra Wisniewska et al., Gender Pay Gap: How Women Are Short-Changed in the UK, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://ig.ft.com/gender-pay-gap-UK (providing an overview of the rule 
and an analysis of the data). 
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equal work. Hence, the narrower the pay gap, the “better” the firm. This al-
lows each firm’s gender pay gap disclosure to stand on its own in a way that 
the pay ratio data does not.320 Absent normative priors about the “right” pay 
ratio number, and absent the ability to compare with other firms, the pay ratio 
is not comprehensible in the context of the securities disclosure regime. 
D. Completeness 
The third baseline characteristic of securities disclosure, completeness, 
plays a part in defining the previous two: For disclosure to be accurate and for 
it to be comprehensible to investors, it should not be incomplete. Like accura-
cy and comprehensibility, completeness is an abstract, non-binary concept. 
Several features of the disclosure regime are in place to enhance the com-
pleteness of the disclosed information. 
First, all existing disclosure rules are supplemented by an overarching 
requirement for firms to provide “such further material information, if any, as 
may be necessary to make the required [disclosures], in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”321 In practice, this 
provision serves as a gap filler: it ensures that with respect to any matter for 
which disclosure is required firms also present additional related material in-
formation, if the absence of the additional information would render the un-
derlying information misleading. When firms fail to make the additional dis-
closures, they could be subject to securities law liability.322 This precept is not 
particularly helpful in the pay ratio context, however, because it is unclear 
how the pay ratio could be “misleading,” as long as the disclosing firm has 
made a good faith effort to calculate it in accordance with the SEC’s flexible 
guidance.323 
More important for our purposes, the goal of completeness also plays a 
role in the regulatory design of particular disclosure rules. As noted, firms are 
required to provide disclosure about the compensation of their five highest-
paid executives.324 Recognizing that numerical information alone might paint 
an incomplete picture of compensation arrangements, the SEC has expanded 
                                                                                                                           
 320 The U.K. gender pay gap disclosure rule contains several methodological challenges of its 
own, but those are not as serious as the problems with the pay ratio rule and lie outside the scope 
of our Article. The gender pay gap rule is also more effective in that it applies to all companies—
public and private alike—that have more than 250 employees in the United Kingdom, including 
foreign companies. By contrast, the pay ratio disclosure rule applies only to U.S. public compa-
nies. 
 321 Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2018). 
 322 See HAZEN, supra note 301, §§ 7.0–7.17, 12.1–13.2. 
 323 See supra notes 138–157 and accompanying text. 
 324 Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018). 
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the rules over time to require that firms also present “a narrative description 
of any material factors necessary to an understanding of the information dis-
closed in the [numerical] tables.”325 Even though the pay ratio disclosure rule 
also deals with compensation-related information and bears close similarity to 
executive compensation information, it requires the disclosure only of num-
bers, without additional narrative description. (We return to this point in Part 
VI.) 
The principle of completeness, along with accuracy, also plays a role in 
limiting the ways in which firms are allowed to present information. In fact, 
under what could be characterized as an “anti-soundbite principle,” firms are 
prohibited from reporting information that is incomplete and lacks context. 
Companies are often tempted to devise non-standard financial metrics that 
make their results of operations, financial condition, or prospects appear more 
favorable than they are in actuality. Such company-devised metrics are 
known as pro forma metrics, or non-GAAP metrics.326 Much like pay ratio 
figures, non-GAAP metrics often lack context and nuance, and may paint an 
incomplete or misleading picture of the underlying topic. 
The use of non-GAAP metrics came to be seen as a problem in the wake 
of the corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s,327 and the SEC 
brought its first case challenging misleading pro forma earnings information 
in 2002.328 Congress addressed this issue in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed 
later the same year, by directing the SEC to adopt a regulation (which subse-
quently came to be known as Regulation G) requiring companies that choose 
to disclose non-GAAP financial metrics to also include a presentation of the 
most directly-comparable GAAP financial metrics and to give those metrics 
equal or greater prominence.329 In addition, companies are required to pro-
vide a reconciliation of the disclosed non-GAAP financial metrics to the most 
directly comparable GAAP financial metric.330 
                                                                                                                           
 325 Regulation S-K, Item 402(e)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(e)(1) (2018). 
 326 See Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act 
Release No. 8176, Exchange Act Release No. 47,226, 68 Fed. Reg. 4819 (Jan. 30, 2003). 
 327 See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2002), https://
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html [https://perma.cc/TEQ2-LCRP] (listing numer-
ous corporate scandals in the early 2000s). 
 328 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Brings First Pro Forma Financial Report-
ing Case—Trump Hotels Charged with Issuing Misleading Earnings Release (Jan. 16, 2002), https://
www.sec.gov/news/headlines/trumphotels.htm [https://perma.cc/TUU9-VYJW]. The SEC’s Director 
of Enforcement at the time noted: “In this case, the method of presenting the pro forma numbers and 
the positive spin the Company put on them were materially misleading. The case starkly illustrates 
how pro forma numbers can be used deceptively and the mischief that they can cause.” Id. 
 329 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (2012)). 
 330 Id. 
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Zooming out of the technical requirements of specific disclosure rules, it 
is worth recalling our broader point: Through various devices, the securities 
disclosure regime generally takes care to ensure the informational integrity 
(i.e., the accuracy, comprehensibility, and completeness) of the information 
firms are required to disclose. By comparison, and in its current formulation, 
the pay ratio disclosure rule fails to exhibit these baseline attributes of securi-
ties disclosure. 
V. THE DISCLOSURE-AS-SOUNDBITE APPROACH:  
FEATURES AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Our discussion so far has sought to present a comprehensive and objec-
tive account of the pay ratio disclosure project. Building on this evidence, in 
this Part we suggest that the pay ratio rule represents a unique approach to 
securities disclosure characterized by high public salience and low informa-
tional integrity, which we term disclosure-as-soundbite. Our overall assess-
ment of the effectiveness of this approach differs depending on what we ac-
cept to be the proper function(s) of the rule. We find that the pay ratio is inef-
fectual and potentially counterproductive in fulfilling an informational or a 
behavioral function, but that it could be more successful, though still subop-
timal, in fulfilling a public discourse function. 
A. The Unique Disclosure-As-Soundbite Approach 
One of the goals of this Article is to point out the numerous idiosyncra-
sies of the pay ratio disclosure rule. Two of these define the pay ratio: its ca-
pacity to draw in multiple audiences by virtue of its simplicity and accessibil-
ity, which we discussed in Part III and which results in what we call high pub-
lic salience, and its low informational integrity, which we explored in Part IV. 
The disclosure-as-soundbite label aims to capture these distinctive attributes 
of the pay ratio. 
The information produced as a result of most traditional SEC disclosure 
rules rarely draws the attention of non-corporate constituencies. In part, this is 
due to the topics of those rules, which have limited direct relevance to public 
policy and are of interest primarily to investors. In part, this is also due to the 
rules’ design, which ensures that relevant information is explained and placed 
in context. Disclosure reports filed with the SEC generally attract public at-
tention only when there is a corporate crisis or scandal and remain out of pub-
lic view the rest of the time.331 
                                                                                                                           
 331 See, e.g., Dave Michaels & Georgia Wells, SEC Probes Why Facebook Didn’t Warn 
Sooner on Privacy Lapse, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-
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The pay ratio rule shrewdly flips this disclosure model on its head. By 
linking the earnings of rank-and-file workers (through the concept of median 
worker pay) to those of corporate executives, the pay ratio takes on a personal 
dimension and resonates with the public to an extent that is much greater than 
information about CEO pay alone. Recent experimental evidence confirms 
that the pay ratio has a strong impact on shaping opinions: When presented 
with pay ratio data, laypersons zero in on it and become indifferent to infor-
mation about firm performance.332 This public resonance is further enhanced 
by the superficial simplicity and accessibility of the single-number ratio: a 
succinct bit of data that can easily appear to the person consuming it to carry 
a great deal more information than it actually does. 
One way to summarize the confluence of these factors is high public sa-
lience. Typically, salience is used in the behavioral law and economics litera-
ture to refer to risks that are highly known and immediately grasped, such that 
the average person may overweight their importance.333 Environmental right-
to-know laws provide one example: The mandated disclosure to consumers of 
dangerous-sounding chemicals in the air or as product ingredients may lead 
those consumers to misperceive risks, misallocate resources, and frustrate 
health, safety, and environmental objectives.334 Information about taxes, 
which resemble the pay ratio in that they relate to persons’ finances, may in 
certain cases be so salient that it could influence voter decisions and legisla-
tion.335  
The pay ratio disclosure rule introduces this dynamic to the securities 
disclosure context. An oft-repeated argument in securities regulation is that 
the presentation of too much information or of information in a format that is 
not easily digestible may reduce the usefulness of the disclosure through “in-
formation overload.”336 On the flipside, however, information could also be 
made more salient by manipulating its format by, for example, simplifying 
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the language or reducing the narrative discussions.337 The pay ratio disclosure 
rule does just that. The resulting phenomenon is new to the securities disclo-
sure regime and it could represent a more pernicious corollary to information 
overload. 
Part of the challenge is that there is a trade-off between public salience 
and informational integrity. The features that underlie the pay ratio’s success 
in drawing in multiple audiences come at the cost of low informational integ-
rity. As discussed in Part IV, it is not possible for a ratio that is the product of 
methodologically complex concepts such as median worker pay and CEO pay 
to exhibit a degree of accuracy, comprehensibility, and completeness in line 
with disclosure rules that require a detailed and nuanced presentation of 
mainstream corporate information. 
To be sure, certain types of corporate disclosure share some of the pay 
ratio’s characteristics, though none match the disclosure-as-soundbite ap-
proach in full. For example, data on CEO pay and the existence of golden 
parachute arrangements often makes its way from corporate filings into the 
public realm, suggesting that it also has high public salience.338 Still, execu-
tive compensation information is different because it exhibits a degree of in-
formational integrity that the pay ratio information does not have: The CD&A 
report, which features numerical information about CEO pay, also contains a 
lot of nuanced and detailed information placing executive compensation data 
in context.339 Even if most of the nuance gets lost as part of the publicity, the 
underlying executive compensation disclosure is generally sound and compa-
rable across firms. 
B. Does the Pay Ratio Rule Fulfill Its Potential Functions? 
Our assessment of the effectiveness of the pay ratio disclosure rule is 
framed with reference to the three potential functions discussed in Part I.D. 
Recall that even though the SEC determined that the pay ratio rule is intended 
to fulfill an informational function, stakeholders have ascribed other functions 
to the rule, in addition to or in lieu of the informational function. This poly-
phonic quality is also illustrated by the actual use of the pay ratio information 
by multiple audiences, discussed in Part III. As noted in Part I.D, we do not 
take a position on the appropriate function of the rule, or the appropriate mix 
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of functions; instead, we offer separate assessments of the rule’s relative suc-
cess in fulfilling each of the three possible functions. 
1. Informational Function 
For the pay ratio rule to fulfill its informational function, it must produce 
disclosure that can inform investors’ voting and buy/sell decisions. Since the 
information released pursuant to the rule is characterized by low information-
al integrity, as discussed in Part IV, the rule is ineffectual on this count. What 
is more, the rule may also be counterproductive or harmful, because it has the 
potential to disrupt and distort investor decisionmaking. 
From the point of view of investors, attempting to interpret the pay ratio 
data can easily lead to flawed inferences. The assumption behind the pay ratio 
is that “high” pay ratios would be viewed negatively by investors. This would 
generally be true for pro-social investors concerned primarily with pay equi-
ty.340 But for an investor concerned solely or primarily with financial returns, 
a high pay ratio could send both positive and negative signals. 
On the one hand, a high pay ratio may indicate that executive compensa-
tion is “too high” and corporate resources are being wasted, or that the board 
is captured by management—all negative signals.341 On the other hand, a 
highly-paid CEO and a high pay ratio may mean that the pay-for-performance 
principle is embedded in the firm’s compensation philosophy. When compar-
ing two firms with an identical labor force, the CEO of the better-performing 
firm should therefore receive higher compensation than the CEO of the 
worse-performing firm, and higher CEO pay would result in a higher pay 
ratio. In this case the high pay ratio should send a positive signal: the firm is 
performing well and rewards executives accordingly, which can be expected 
to create the conditions for sustained strong performance in the future.342 
                                                                                                                           
 340 Such investors are still interpreting methodologically flawed data. They still need some 
external benchmark to determine what constitutes a “high” and what constitutes a “low” pay ratio. 
In the very least, however, they know that low pay ratios are positive signals and high pay ratios 
are negative signals. 
 341 These intuitions are supported by empirical evidence suggesting that firms with higher pay 
gaps are less profitable than firms with smaller pay gaps. See, e.g., SAMUEL BLOCK, MSCI, INCOME 
INEQUALITY AND THE INTRACORPORATE PAY GAP (2016), https://www.msci.com/documents/
10199/b94ae705-4d36-49e5-8873-b6fe42fdd291 [https://perma.cc/6J2D-PFB9]. 
 342 The incentive-based theory underlying pay-for-performance is intuitive and generally 
accepted, but the practical tasks of implementing effective pay-for-performance compensation 
models, or even quantifying “performance,” have been a perennial challenge. See, e.g., RIC MAR-
SHALL & LINDA-ELING LEE, MSCI, ARE CEOS PAID FOR PERFORMANCE?: EVALUATING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUITY INCENTIVES (2016), https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/91a7
f92b-d4ba-4d29-ae5f-8022f9bb944d [https://perma.cc/EW4K-LZ67] (reporting the results of an 
empirical study showing inverse correlation between measures of CEO pay and firm performance 
over a 10-year period). 
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The result of this interpretation challenge is that investors may misiden-
tify firms and misallocate capital. Moreover, when investors fail to invest in 
high-quality firms with effective pay-for-performance compensation schemes 
because the resulting (high) pay ratios are erroneously perceived as a negative 
signal, this undermines the SEC’s goal of aligning executive pay with corpo-
rate performance. 
2. Behavioral Function 
Whether or not the pay ratio rule fulfills a behavioral function is a slight-
ly more complicated question because in theory the pay ratio data does have 
the potential to “shame” companies and influence corporate behavior. If 
boards expect that the pay ratio disclosures will be subjected to scrutiny from 
investors, employees, or the public, they may seek to improve the pay ratio by 
reducing CEO pay or increasing median worker pay, or, more generally, de-
vote more attention to employee compensation matters. While possible in 
theory, these effects are unlikely to obtain in any systematic way in practice 
because of the muddled nature of the pay ratio information and the attenuated 
linkages between pay ratio disclosure and the desired changes in corporate 
behavior. Ultimately, the pay ratio appears to be ineffectual in fulfilling a be-
havioral function, and it could potentially have counterproductive or harmful 
effects on corporate conduct. 
Consider how the pay ratio affects corporate decisionmaking. The pay 
ratio data influences perceptions easily due to its high public salience, a de-
sign feature of the disclosure-as-soundbite approach discussed in Part V.A. In 
this context, firms may rationally choose to manage pay ratio optics at the 
expense of sound business decisions, even though they realize the problemat-
ic nature of the pay ratio information. Corporate boards control CEO pay, one 
of the two components of the pay ratio, so they can reduce the pay ratio by 
reducing CEO pay. An unjustified reduction in CEO pay, however, may un-
dermine the firm’s pay-for-performance compensation model, and it may also 
lead the firm to lose talent. The two sets of incentives at play in this case 
point in opposite directions. 
The other way of improving the pay ratio—by increasing median worker 
pay—is even more problematic. It is true that firms can improve the median 
worker pay figure by increasing pay throughout the organization, which 
would be a positive effect. But firms can also achieve the same result more 
cheaply by engaging in a range of behaviors with negative welfare conse-
quences. For example, a firm can redistribute income from the lowest-paid 
workers to workers at the median. This counterproductive strategy would not 
increase the total amount the firm spends on employee compensation, but it 
will increase its median worker pay figure. The firm looks better without pay-
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ing workers more. A firm can also outsource the work done by the lowest-
paid workers. Once those workers are off the firm’s payroll and on the payroll 
of a subcontractor, the firm’s median worker pay figure would automatically 
go up, again making the firm look better, even if the outsourced employees 
are paid the same (or less) by the subcontractor.343 
To be sure, the frequency with which firms will engage in these forms of 
manipulation cannot be predicted, and, moreover, some of the manipulation 
may be unobservable even when it occurs. There could also be one-off cases 
where sustained pressure, including by means of highlighting a high pay ra-
tio, could lead firms to reform their pay practices for the lowest-paid work-
ers.344 Our principal point is that the pay ratio is unlikely to move CEO pay or 
median worker pay in a desirable direction, in a systematic way. 
For policymakers seeking to shape corporate behavior through disclo-
sure, the U.K. gender pay gap disclosure rule discussed in Part IV.C provides 
an instructive counter-example. The behavioral aspect of the disclosure rule is 
clear: to nudge (or shame) firms into achieving gender pay equity. There is a 
clear link between the information that is required to be disclosed (the pay 
gap) and the public policy objective (pay equity). What is more, though there 
are two ways to narrow the gender pay gap, either by paying women more or 
men less, neither one of these carries the risk of unforeseen negative effects 
similar to the ones observed with the pay ratio disclosure rule.345 
3. Public Discourse Function 
As we showed in Part III, the pay ratio data has received significant at-
tention from the news media, national politicians, state and local govern-
ments, labor unions, and think tanks. Those in the public sphere who ana-
lyzed the pay ratio disclosures did so with reference to income inequality; 
                                                                                                                           
 343 This is not an exhaustive list of the ways in which firms might manipulate the pay ratio. 
For example, firms can also adopt a compensation scheme under which the total economic value 
of CEO pay is not captured by the chosen methodology, as would be the case with performance-
based stock options not included under an all-cash compensation methodology. More broadly, 
CEO pay is notoriously complex and susceptible to manipulation. See, e.g., Ross Kerber, Nobel 
Winner Says CEO Pay Too Complex, Echoing Investor Gripe, REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2016), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-nobel-prize-ceopay-idUSKCN12B2QG [https://perma.cc/F96H-T9UL] 
(noting that the extreme complexity of CEO pay structures make them difficult to understand and 
manage). 
 344 See, e.g., Alex Shephard, Why Amazon Raised Its Minimum Wage, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 3, 
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151521/amazon-raised-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/
LM2C-GRQ6] (reporting on the success of a campaign by Senator Bernie Sanders to pressure 
Amazon into raising its minimum wage); supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the use of pay ratios in connection with this campaign. 
 345 To be sure, the gender pay gap rule can be criticized in various ways. Our point is simply 
that it is superior in its design to the U.S. pay ratio rule. 
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those who used pay ratios as part of legislation justified the legislation as a 
means of combatting income inequality; those who merely cited pay ratio 
figures to make rhetorical points also did so on questions relating to income 
inequality. As a factual matter, then, the pay ratio rule has not simply become 
part of public discourse—it has also achieved a level of public visibility that, 
for the time being, is unmatched by other disclosure rules. But what is the 
quality of the pay ratio’s contribution to public discourse, and what other ef-
fects might this have? 
Because of its high public salience and the attention it generates, the pay 
ratio data likely increases public consciousness of CEO-to-worker pay dispar-
ities. Survey evidence suggests that the public consistently underestimates the 
magnitude of these disparities: The average member of the public believes the 
economy-wide CEO-to-median worker pay ratio to be 10:1, which is signifi-
cantly lower than the actual ratios.346 In this context, the informational integ-
rity and comparability of the pay ratio data matter very little, because the gap 
between public perception and reality is so large. The actual pay ratio figure 
is merely a conceptual hook that ensures the public salience of the infor-
mation. The message that is doing the work is that a large pay gap exists and 
that it persists. 
The pay ratio’s frequent association with income inequality also likely 
reinforces existing anxieties about pay inequities and economic inequality. In 
this context, the trade-offs between public salience and informational integri-
ty become important. The rule is designed to ensure that public discourse will 
take place, and that it will be repeated every year during the annual corporate 
reporting season, which stretches several months. Apart from frequency, 
however, there should also be a concern with the quality of public discourse, 
which depends on the quality of the information that is used as part of this 
discourse. 
Once we shift the focus to the quality of public discourse, linking the 
pay ratio to income inequality becomes potentially problematic. Income ine-
quality is an imprecise umbrella term used to refer to a variety of interrelated 
problems. In the pay ratio context, those could include the high disparities 
between the pay of rank-and-file workers and corporate executives within 
firms across the economy (pay inequity), or to broader inequalities in wealth 
distribution within society (economic inequality). Economic inequality, how-
ever, is better understood as wealth inequality.347 Yet, the pay ratio’s focus on 
                                                                                                                           
 346 See LARCKER ET AL., supra note 316, at 4; see also Kiatpongsan & Norton, supra note 41 
and accompanying text. 
 347 See generally EDWARD N. WOLFF, A CENTURY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA (2017) (docu-
menting major decreases in average U.S. household wealth in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis). 
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disparities in income does nothing to capture relative wealth. It would also be 
simplistic to view the executive compensation packages of public company 
CEOs and the ratios of CEO pay to median worker pay as useful proxies for 
inequality: Public companies represent a limited sample of the economy, and 
the pay packages of public company CEOs pale in comparison to those of 
private equity executives, many of whom often receive more than $1 billion 
annually.348 Ultimately, there is evidence that inequality is associated with 
other factors, such as the persistent gap between increases in productivity and 
increases in wages,349 growing automation,350 and firms’ potentially unlawful 
market power.351 
Relying too much on pay ratios also has the capacity to distract and even 
backfire. Their use in substantive tax legislation is, quite plainly, poor public 
policy, because pay ratios are so imprecise and easily-to-manipulate.352 When 
Portland-style regulatory measures attract public scrutiny, the focus falls on the 
inadequacies of the data and peculiarities of the pay ratio disclosure rule, not 
on the important problems these measures are trying to solve. There could also 
be undesirable placebo effect at play: If the public’s association between pay 
ratio information and inequality becomes strengthened, any subsequent de-
creases in firms’ pay ratios could be easily misinterpreted as a sign that ine-
quality is becoming less of a problem, even if the underlying evidence does 
not support this. 
The pay ratio disclosure rule has also been a challenge for the SEC, a 
much narrower concern, but one that could have important regulatory conse-
quences. The seven-year implementation process, during which the SEC re-
ceived hundreds of thousands of comment letters and had to resolve multiple 
                                                                                                                           
 348 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Michael Corkery, Just How Much Do the Top Private Equity 
Earners Make?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/business/deal
book/just-how-much-do-the-top-private-equity-earners-make.html [https://perma.cc/KXV6-KNTM]. 
 349 See, e.g., The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2018), https://www.epi.
org/productivity-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/AP5T-5URY]. 
 350 See, e.g., Nicolas Yan, Automated Inequality, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 2, 2016), http://
harvardpolitics.com/world/automation [https://perma.cc/M5FS-76H7]. 
 351 See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Op-Ed., Corporate America Is Suppressing 
Wages for Many Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/
opinion/corporate-america-suppressing-wages.html [https://perma.cc/3RKS-VSRC] (suggesting that 
practices such as non-compete clauses in employment contracts are suppressing worker wages); 
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, More and More Companies Have Monopoly Power Over 
Workers’ Wages. That’s Killing the Economy, VOX (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2018/4/6/17204808/wages-employers-workers-monopsony-growth-stagnation-inequality 
[https://perma.cc/G9QB-4DB7] (linking depressed worker wages and income inequality to firms’ 
monopoly power). 
 352 Recall that the integrity of the SEC data has been criticized by EPI, a think tank generally 
sympathetic to the use of pay ratios as regulatory tools, which further suggests that the SEC pay 
ratio rule is not fit for this purpose. See supra notes 255–259 and accompanying text. 
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interpretative ambiguities, has been a drain on the agency’s administrative 
resources. The charged nature of the subject matter exposed the SEC to un-
comfortable political pressure on a number of occasions, an issue that former 
SEC Chair Mary Jo White lamented.353 The pay ratio disclosure rule has also 
been used as Exhibit A in debates over the utility of the SEC disclosure re-
gime, giving ammunition to those who argue that the entire regime is overly 
burdensome and ought to be scaled back.354 Even setting such efforts aside, 
the fact that the pay ratio is characterized by low informational integrity may 
undermine the overall integrity of the securities disclosure regime. 
Based on the evidence available to date, our assessment is that the pay 
ratio could make a limited positive contribution to public discourse. The low 
informational integrity of the data, however, creates the risk that instead of 
shining a light on issues of inequality, the pay ratio might divert the spotlight 
away from them and even do damage to the very cause it is trying to advance. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Many of the problems associated with the pay ratio rule result from the 
high public salience and low informational integrity of the pay ratio data (the 
disclosure-as-soundbite approach), and not necessarily from the nature of the 
information being reported (executive pay and median worker pay). To this 
end, we argue for a move away from the disclosure-as-soundbite approach. 
We suggest that, instead, the underlying information should be presented in a 
narrative approach that provides more context, nuance, and explanation. In 
practice, this means that the pay ratio information would be treated in the 
                                                                                                                           
 353 Cydney Posner, In Her Final Speech as SEC Chair, White Identifies Current Trends As-
sailing SEC Independence, COOLEY PUBCO (Jan. 20, 2017), https://cooleypubco.com/2017/01/
20/in-her-final-speech-as-sec-chair-white-identifies-current-trends-assailing-sec-independence 
[https://perma.cc/7PH2-CH6E] (noting that the pay ratio disclosure rule exemplifies the trend 
toward “highly prescriptive [congressional] mandates” which threatens SEC independence). 
 354 See, e.g., Society of Corporate Governance Professionals, Comment Letter on Reconsider-
ation of Dodd Frank Section 953(b), The Pay Ratio Rule (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/pay-ratio-statement/cll3-1664965-148929.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4HZ-RNN7] (asserting 
that the pay ratio disclosure rule “exacerbates a significant problem with the current disclosure [re-
gime]—overloading disclosure documents with information that is not material to investors”); Busi-
ness Roundtable, BRT Letter on the Core Principles for Regulating the U.S. Financial System (Sept. 
1, 2017), https://www.businessroundtable.org/brt-letter-on-the-core-principles-for-regulating-the-us-
financial-system [https://perma.cc/BMS2-EKSF] (asserting that certain disclosure rules, including the 
pay ratio disclosure rule, are in conflict with “the materiality standard for public company disclosure 
. . . [and] long-term interests of ordinary investors”); see also U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, A FINAN-
CIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 29 (2017), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/a-financial-system-capital-markets-final-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB9L-CPT7] (recommending legislation to “remove non-material 
disclosure requirements,” including, among others, the pay ratio disclosure rule). 
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same way as the executive compensation information that is currently part of 
the disclosure regime: whenever existing rules require numerical disclosures 
about executive pay, the numbers are always followed by a narrative explana-
tion. 
The scope of our policy proposal is framed by the assumption that the 
pay ratio disclosure rule will not be repealed in the near term. Though the rule 
has been the target of repeated repeal efforts and remains highly controver-
sial, it has been remarkably resilient even as other Dodd-Frank rules have 
been struck down by Congress.355 Experience with similar executive com-
pensation rules, such as IRS Section 162(m), also suggests that even when the 
rules are widely viewed as deficient, they can be difficult to repeal.356  
As discussed in Part II, the SEC sought to minimize compliance costs by 
giving firms considerable methodological flexibility in identifying the median 
worker and calculating the median worker’s salary and the resulting pay ratio. 
Driven by the same compliance cost concerns, the SEC also chose not to re-
quire firms to provide narrative disclosure explaining the reported figures and 
the majority of the associated methodological choices.357 In other words, the 
SEC adopted a “numbers-only” approach. 
                                                                                                                           
 355 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 356 See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012) (imposing a $1 million cap on the deductibility of executive 
compensation). For criticism of Section 162(m), see Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The 
Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 301, 332 (1995); Gregg D. 
Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
877, 920 (2007). Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Section 162(m) was amended to remove the 
performance pay exception to the deductibility cap, but it was not repealed and may not even have 
closed the performance-based exception. See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax 
Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1518–19 
(2019) (suggesting ways to retain the performance-based exception through appropriate structur-
ing post-2017 Act).  
 357 In the Pay Ratio Adopting Release, the SEC explained its approach as follows: 
[W]e recognize the possibility that, based on the specific facts and circumstances of 
a registrant’s work force and corporate operations, the pay ratio disclosure may war-
rant additional disclosures from a registrant to ensure that, in the registrant’s view, 
the pay ratio disclosure is a meaningful data point for investors when making their 
say-on-pay votes. While Congress appears to have believed that the pay ratio disclo-
sure would be a useful data point, we recognize that its relative usefulness—taken 
alone without accompanying disclosures to provide potentially important context—
may vary considerably. Rather than prescribe a one-size-fits-all catalogue of addi-
tional disclosures that registrants should provide to put the pay ratio disclosure in 
context, we believe it is the better course to provide registrants the flexibility to pro-
vide additional disclosures that they believe will assist investors’ understanding of 
the meaning of pay ratio disclosure when making say-on-pay votes. In this way, we 
believe we can best fulfill Congress’s directive in Section 953(b) while avoiding un-
necessary costs and complexities that might result from mandating additional disclo-
sures. 
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Even though it may not have been apparent at the time, those were two 
separate decisions, and the compliance costs should not have been conflated. 
It is true that giving firms methodological flexibility along the lines described 
in Part II served to reduce compliance costs considerably. In fact, it probably 
would have been impossible to implement the pay ratio mandate without such 
methodological flexibility. It is, however, at best uncertain whether not requir-
ing firms to explain the numbers results in any meaningful compliance cost 
savings. Yet, this lack of explanation inflates the public salience and reduces 
the informational integrity of the pay ratio information. In arguing for addi-
tional context, nuance, and explanation, we therefore seek to move away 
from the flawed disclosure-as-soundbite approach. And, because firms al-
ready have the requisite information to provide these additional clarifying 
disclosures, our proposal is unlikely to result in substantial additional costs. 
As to the content of the additional narrative information, we propose that 
the SEC follow the well-established template of the CD&A section, which is 
governed by Item 402 of Regulation S-K (the “CD&A rules”).358 Specifically, 
the CD&A rules require firms to disclose in tabular format the compensation 
received by the five highest-paid executives broken down by type (salary, 
stock options, etc.), as well as any incentive plan-based compensation. Im-
mediately following these tables, the CD&A rules require firms to provide “a 
narrative description of any material factors necessary to an understanding of 
the information disclosed in the tables”; the rules also guide firms by provid-
ing a non-exhaustive list of examples of such factors.359 The CD&A rules 
follow the exact same approach with respect to each of the many categories 
of quantitative information required to be presented in tabular format: out-
standing equity awards; option exercises and stock vested; pension benefits; 
deferred compensation; and compensation of directors.360 In short, any table 
containing numbers is to be followed by a narrative that discusses the materi-
al factors necessary for understanding the information. We suggest that the 
same should be done for the pay ratio numbers. 
Potential examples of material factors necessary to an understanding of 
the pay ratio information may include the firm’s philosophy for determining 
the pay of the median worker; a discussion of the structure of the labor force 
(for example, whether the firm uses contractors, part-time employees, and 
offshore workers, and whether it relies extensively on automation); and an 
explanation of the reasons for any significant changes from prior years. As 
with the rest of the CD&A rules, the SEC should come up with basic exam-
                                                                                                                           
Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,107. 
 358 Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018). 
 359 Id. at Item 402(e)(1). 
 360 Id. at Item 402. 
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ples of material factors in consultation with companies and investors. It 
should then place the onus on companies to identify the unique factors that 
are material to them—an inquiry that is meant to be contextual and nuanced. 
Adopting this approach would be consistent with the evolution of the SEC 
disclosure regime in the area of executive compensation. Many of the early 
disclosure rules in this area did not require companies to provide explana-
tions, but the mounting frustration with the difficulty of interpreting numbers-
only disclosures gradually led to the introduction of rules requiring narrative 
discussions.361 
In the Pay Ratio Adopting Release, the SEC took the view that giving 
firms “flexibility to provide additional disclosures . . . [to] assist investors’ 
understanding of the meaning of pay ratio disclosure” would lead firms to 
provide such disclosure voluntarily when appropriate.362 The evidence from 
the first season of pay ratio reporting suggests that the SEC was too optimis-
tic. An empirical study looking at supplemental ratios (which can be viewed 
as a proxy for supplemental information) found that only 14% of firms in a 
sample of 1,125 large firms reported such supplemental ratios, and many did 
so for opportunistic reasons.363 These results are consistent with experts’ ad-
vice to firms prior to the rule’s effectiveness: when it comes to pay ratio dis-
closure, less is more.364 As in other areas of the securities disclosure regime, 
the absence of a mandatory disclosure rule results in selective voluntary re-
porting.365 This suggests that the best way to improve the pay ratio rule would 
be to require all public companies to provide information about the material 
factors driving the pay ratio numbers. 
Our suggestion that in the pay ratio context less is not more finds some 
independent confirmation in the design of the U.K. pay ratio disclosure rule, 
                                                                                                                           
 361 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, supra note 269. 
 362 See Pay Ratio Adopting Release, supra note 97, at 50,107. 
 363 Sun Moon Jung et al., Why Do Firms Disclose a Supplementary CEO-to-Median Worker 
Pay Ratio? Initial Evidence from Dodd-Frank Act Section 953(b), at 3 (Dec. 3, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract_id=3234013 [https://perma.cc/2XK4-
JTZ4]. The authors found that among the firms that did provide supplemental ratios, 86% reported 
a supplemental ratio that was lower than the main ratio. Firms with greater excess CEO compensa-
tion and a higher-than-industry median pay ratio were also more likely to provide a supplemental 
pay ratio. Id. 
 364 See, e.g., James D. C. Barrall, On Governance: CEO Pay Ratio Planning: 10 Consensuses 
from Thought Leading Companies, THE CONFERENCE BOARD (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.
conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6596 [https://perma.cc/TTF2-S8VD] (reporting 
“[t]he strong consensus of the thought leading companies and their advisors” that during the first 
season of pay ratio reporting firms should not provide more pay ratio disclosure than what is 
strictly required). 
 365 See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory 
of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 686–88 (2002) (discussing the reasons for 
the undersupply of information in the absence of a system of mandatory disclosure). 
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which was adopted three years after the U.S. rule, in July 2018.366 The U.K. 
rule requires firms to relate CEO pay to the pay of not one but three different 
employees—the median employee, the 25th percentile employee, and the 
75th percentile employee, and report three pay ratios. In addition, the U.K. 
rule defines three consistent methodologies for calculating the ratio and re-
quires firms to identify which methodology they have followed. The U.K. 
rule also calls for narrative disclosure on “whether, and if so why, the compa-
ny believes the median pay ratio for the relevant financial year is consistent 
with the pay, reward and progression policies for the company’s U.K. em-
ployees taken as a whole.”367 This approach can be expected to result in dis-
closures that have higher informational integrity. The contextual information 
that will accompany the pay ratio numbers can also be expected to moderate 
the public salience of the information and make it more difficult to sensation-
alize. 
In summary, our proposal to move beyond the numbers-only approach 
in the United States aims to enhance the relative informational integrity of 
pay ratio disclosure. We believe that this improvement in the quality of the 
disclosed information would make the pay ratio more useful to investors, and, 
consequently, go some way toward fulfilling the pay ratio rule’s informational 
function. Our proposal would also make it more difficult for firms to improve 
their pay ratio optics by manipulating the pay ratio without detection by alter-
ing the structure of their workforce. This would ameliorate some of the coun-
terproductive behavioral effects of the pay ratio rule as it currently stands. 
Finally, the additional information may contribute to improving the quality of 
public discourse on matters related to pay inequity and economic inequality. 
The new pay ratio disclosures may have somewhat lower public salience as a 
result of the increase in the quantum of information, but this could well be a 
price worth paying. 
                                                                                                                           
 366 See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860, Explanatory 
Memorandum ¶ 2.1 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/860/pdfs/uksiem_20180860_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NP8E-2HC6]. 
 367 The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860, arts. 19B–19F 
(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/860/pdfs/uksi_20180860_en.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8JWH-L495]. The U.K. rule also contains certain other requirements which will make the in-
formation released pursuant to it more detailed and nuanced than the information required under 
the U.S. pay ratio rule. See id. The U.K. pay ratio disclosures will not start appearing until 2020, 
so it remains to be seen whether the U.K. approach leads to a pay ratio experience qualitatively 
different from the U.S. one. 
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CONCLUSION 
The many idiosyncratic aspects of the pay ratio disclosure rule have 
made for a recurring theme throughout this Article. The congressional man-
date contained in the Dodd-Frank Act was highly specific on the required 
disclosure output, but silent on the definitions of the unusual disclosure in-
puts. This challenged the SEC’s rulemaking apparatus and placed the agency 
at the center of near-unprecedented political controversy. The rule as it exists 
today is characterized by what we describe as high public salience. This 
quality is evidenced by the attention the data has received from multiple audi-
ences; it is explained by the nature of the required information and its superfi-
cial simplicity. The rule is also characterized by low informational integrity 
relative to the rest of the securities disclosure regime. These two aspects, high 
public salience and low informational integrity, define the unique disclosure-
as-soundbite approach. 
Taking a step back, we find that there is another question lurking be-
neath the surface, a question that has been obscured by the pay ratio’s many 
peculiarities: What, if any, workforce compensation information should be 
part of firms’ disclosure obligations? For all its failings, the pay ratio rule is 
notable for being the first rule in the 85-year history of the SEC disclosure 
regime to require firms to disclose any information about how they pay their 
workers. In fact, the only other disclosure rule dealing with workers simply 
requires firms to report their total number of employees.368 Beyond this single 
number, even basic information, such as the total amount spent on compensa-
tion, is not subject to disclosure. This oversight is all the more remarkable in 
light of the fact that firms are required to provide detailed information about 
executive compensation, which routinely results in tens of pages about the 
pay received by just a handful of executives.369 Why is it that under the cur-
rent regulatory regime “labor” as a factor of production—aside from execu-
tive labor—is practically invisible in corporate filings?370 This and other re-
                                                                                                                           
 368 Regulation S-K, Item 101(c)(xiii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xiii) (2018) (requiring firms to 
disclose “the number of persons employed” by them). 
 369 Executive Compensation Filings Grow to Nearly 10,000 Words on Average, EQUILAR 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.equilar.com/press-releases/95-exec-comp-filings-grow-to-nearly-10K-
words.html [https://perma.cc/SV98-DQYH] (reporting that in 2017 the average word count of the 
CD&A section of the proxy statements of the 100 largest companies was 9490 words). 
 370 Depending on the circumstances, information about the workforce may be released pursu-
ant to other existing line item disclosure requirements, if the information is material. For example, 
the possibility of strikes is sometimes disclosed as a risk factor. As a practical matter, the lack of 
line item disclosure requirements specifically devoted to labor and the need to engage in complex 
materiality determinations make such disclosures scarce. See generally Georgiev, supra note 299 
(discussing the uncertain outcomes of the materiality determinations required by the disclosure 
regime). 
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lated questions about the need for workforce compensation and human capital 
disclosure are both fascinating and expansive, and we intend to pursue them 
in future work.371 
                                                                                                                           
 371 See Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Non-Executive Compensation, Human Capital 
Management, and Corporate Governance (on file with authors). 
  
 
